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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the macroeconomic consequences of frictional labor mar-
kets in the United States and in Europe. It consists of three essays.
In Chapter 2, Jiwoon Kim and I develop a model with both frictional labor markets
and financial frictions to explore how the dynamics of real and financial variables are
affected by ‘financial shocks’. We evaluate how important the inclusion of financial
shocks is in accounting for labor market fluctuations by using a standard real business
cycle model with search and matching as a benchmark. We find that the inclusion of
financial frictions and financial shocks improves a standard matching model’s ability to
account for the observed dynamics of labor market variables. Financial frictions are
able to generate more volatile hours per worker, labor shares, and employment relative
to our benchmark matching model, bringing simulated moments closer to observed
fluctuations.
Chapter 3 documents the cyclical properties of labor market flows in the United
States and in Europe at business cycle frequencies. I create comparable quarterly es-
timates of the hazard rates across 19 European countries and the United States using
the methodology pioneered by Shimer (2012). I then quantitatively assess the contri-
bution of the job-finding and separation rates to the variability of unemployment over
the business cycle in each country. In the United States, the job-finding hazard rate
accounted for over three-quarters of the variation in unemployment while the separa-
tion rate accounted for the remainder. Most European labor markets have a 60:40 split
between the job-finding rate and the separation rate, respectively.
Chapter 4 studies policy issues related to precarious forms of employment over a
worker’s life-cycle. A search and matching model with dual labor markets, overlapping
generations of workers, and general and match-specific skills is presented in order to
quantify and evaluate the effects of loosening restrictions on temporary forms of em-
ployment. Despite the increased likelihood of being employed, workers will be worse off
due to a greater share of workers starting their careers in low-paying temporary posi-
tions, limiting young workers’ ability to upgrade their skill level early in the life-cycle.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation is a theoretical and quantitative investigation of frictional labor mar-
kets and macroeconomic outcomes.
• Chapter 2, “Labor Market Fluctuations and the Role of Financial Shocks,” devel-
ops a model with both frictional labor markets and financial frictions to explore
how the dynamics of real and financial variables are affected by ‘financial shocks’.
It evaluates how important the inclusion of financial shocks is in accounting for la-
bor market fluctuations by using a standard real business cycle model with search
and matching as a benchmark fo comparison.
• Chapter 3, “Unemployment Dynamics in Europe: The Roles of the Ins and Outs,”
documents the cyclical properties of labor market flows in Europe and compares
them to flows in the United States at business cycle frequencies. It first creates
comparable quarterly estimates of the hazard rates across 19 European countries
and the United States. It then quantitatively assesses the contribution of the job-
finding and separation rates to the variability of unemployment over the business
cycle in each country.
• Chapter 4, “Dual Labor Markets and Life-Cycle Unemployment,” studies policy
issues related to precarious forms of employment over a worker’s life-cycle. A
search and matching model with dual labor markets, overlapping generations of
workers, and general and match-specific skills is presented in order to quantify
and evaluate the effects of labor market reforms.
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Chapter 2
Labor Market Fluctuations and
the Role of Financial Shocks
2.1 Introduction
The financial turmoil that began with the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 brought
about not only one of the largest decreases in real GDP in the US since the Great De-
pression, but also a substantial increase in the rate of unemployment. The unemploy-
ment rate jumped from 4.7% in 2007:Q4 to 9.9% in 2009:Q4 while real GDP decreased
at an astonishing -1.7% annualized rate over the same time period. High unemployment
has persisted and continues to be a challenge today, even after real GDP has recovered
to pre-recession levels. It seems natural to assess the role credit markets have played in
the sharp decrease in employment and its sluggish recovery to pre-recession levels.
The financial crisis and resulting Great Recession have fostered renewed interest in
the incorporation of financial frictions in macroeconomic models. Many recent studies
have emphasized the importance of employing such frictions to account for macroe-
conomic fluctuations in key variables over the business cycle. In particular, so called
‘financial shocks’ have been deemed significant contributing factors for the observed
dynamics of real and financial variables over the business cycle. Financial shocks di-
rectly affect the financial sector of the economy as opposed to standard productivity
shocks that are merely propagated through the financial sector. However, applicable
studies have been silent about how unemployment and job postings interact with the
2
3deterioration of credit market conditions. In order to address this shortcoming, we
evaluate just how important financial shocks are in accounting for movements in key
labor market variables by using a standard real business cycle (RBC) matching model
which incorporates financial frictions via an enforcement constraint. We assess the im-
portance of incorporating financial shocks into our model by comparing our results to
those of a standard matching model without financial frictions. We take our benchmark
matching model without financial frictions to be the model developed by Andolfatto
(1996) (simply Andolfatto hereafter). We refer to this as the standard matching model
throughout.
While analyzing the role of the financial sector over the business cycle is not a new
topic, most previous studies utilized the credit channels formalized by Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
and treated the financial sector as an accelerator of productivity shocks. This standard
credit channel differs from those developed more recently by Perri and Quadrini (2011)
and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) (JQ hereafter), which incorporate financial shocks
that directly affect the financial sector’s ability to lend. That is, the financial sector not
only propagates productivity shocks originating from other sectors of the economy, but
it also acts as a source of the business cycle itself via financial shocks. The latter studies
have emphasized the impact of financial shocks in their explanations for labor market
fluctuations but offer no means for analyzing the extensive margin of employment in
their framework.
Some authors have already highlighted the need for addressing the role of financial
frictions on unemployment. Petrosky-Nadeau (2011) uses asymmetric information and
costly state verification between financial intermediaries and borrowers which increases
both the magnitude and persistence of unemployment fluctuations relative to a standard
neoclassical growth model. Chugh (2009) uses a similar credit channel but builds a
model with capital accumulation. Monacelli, Trigari, and Quadrini (2011) use a model
with linear utility and no capital accumulation and show that borrowing more from
financial intermediaries shifts bargaining weight from the worker to the firm which can
explain why firms cut hiring after a negative financial shock even in the absence of a
liquidity shortage. Our study departs from previous approaches and employs the credit
channel used in JQ in order to compare the gains of adding financial frictions over a
4standard matching model as developed by Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Our
model framework is somewhat related to that of Garin (2012), but his study neither
utilizes the intensive margin nor compares the results to a standard RBC matching
model. This distinction is important since the response along the intensive margin to
financial frictions and shocks in our model is quite different from that along the extensive
margin.
We start by documenting the cyclical properties of key variables for the US economy
over the period 1984:Q1-2012:Q1 in Table 2.1. We chose this period for our analysis
since JQ have argued that 1984 corresponds to a break in the volatility in many business
cycle variables and that this time period also saw the stabilization of structural change
in US financial markets compared to previous periods. All variables are deflated by
population, logged (except debt repurchases and equity payouts), and HP-filtered. Debt
repurchases and equity payouts statistics are computed after detrending with a band-
pass filter that preserves cycles of 1.5-8 years (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003). Wages
are defined as real labor compensation per labor-hour. A detailed description of the data
used in Table 2.1 and throughout our study can be found in the Appendix.
Variable (x) σx% ρ (x,Output) ρ (xt, xt−1)
Output 1.12 – 0.87
Total Hours 1.26 0.85 0.89
Employment 0.88 0.82 0.93
Hours per Worker 0.45 0.77 0.61
Wages 0.91 -0.18 0.77
Labor Productivity 0.66 0.07 0.59
Labor Share 0.73 -0.28 0.78
Vacancies 11.26 0.86 0.91
Equity Payouts/GDP 1.39 0.69 0.91
Debt Repurchases/GDP 2.23 -0.84 0.93
Table 2.1: Business Cycle Statistics, 1984:Q1-2012:Q1
A few elements in Table 2.1 deserve some discussion. First, employment is much
more volatile than hours worked per worker. While total hours fluctuate more than
output itself, most of the volatility is due to adjustments along the extensive margin.
The relative contribution of variance in hours per worker to total hours worked is 32%.
Thus, the intensive margin is one that should be incorporated into any model seeking
5to understand fluctuations in total hours worked in the US economy. Employment and
total hours tend to lag output by one quarter while hours worked and vacancies are co-
incident variables which suggests firms are able to adjust the intensive margin and post
vacancies quicker than they can adjust the stock of employees. We will incorporate this
fact into our model. Second, real wages are almost as volatile as output, but are surpris-
ingly countercyclical over our sample period. Third, the labor share is countercyclical,
implying that during periods of expansion, labor is allocated relatively less of the gains.
Finally, note that equity payouts are strongly procyclical while debt repurchases are
strongly countercyclical. As JQ pointed out, there seems to be substitutability between
equity payouts and debt repurchases over the business cycle. It is our goal to discover
what gains can be made in accounting for the fluctuations in the variables reported in
Table 2.1 once financial shocks are incorporated into a standard matching model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 proposes a model with labor market
frictions, financial frictions, and financial shocks. Section 2.3 discusses the calibration of
the models. Section 2.4 studies the quantitative properties of our proposed model and
studies the importance of financial shocks by comparing our model’s results to those of
a standard matching model. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
Our model framework follows closely the models developed by JQ and Andolfatto. Since
the Andolfatto model has a matching framework but no financial frictions, we take this
to be our benchmark model to compare our results to. We will refer to the benchmark
model as the Andolfatto model, the standard matching model, or simply Andolfatto.
Note that the equations characterizing the solution to our model with financial frictions
can quickly be mapped into the Andolfatto model by shutting down both the financial
shock processes and the Lagrange multipliers on the enforcement constraint. For this
reason, we do not lay out the Andolfatto model explicitly but choose to develop our
model with financial frictions first.
62.2.1 Matching
Time is discrete and goes on forever. The timing of our model is as follows: (i) shocks
are realized, (ii) wages and hours are bargained over, (iii) firms take our intra-period
loans, (iv) production takes place and vacancies are posted, and then (v) separations
and matches occur.
Labor markets are frictional and the law of motion of total employment, N , depends
on the number of matches that occur at the end of each period. We take one model
period to be one quarter. We assume that the number of matches is dictated by a
constant returns-to-scale matching technology which depends on the total number of
unemployed, U ≡ 1 − N , and on the total number of vacancies, V , posted by firms:
M(V, 1−N). Defining V/ (1−N) ≡ θ as labor market tightness, we then define the job-
finding rate as Ψ(θ) = M(θ, 1) and the job-filling rate as Φ(θ) = M(1, 1/θ). Assuming
that jobs are destroyed at the exogenous rate χ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that employment
evolves according to:
N ′ = (1− χ)N + Ψ(θ)(1−N)
2.2.2 Households
There is a continuum of identical and infinitely lived households each of measure one.
Each household is endowed with a unit of time to split between working hours and leisure
hours and each household derives utility from consumption and leisure. Households
discount the future by the factor β ∈ (0, 1). We model a representative household
similar to Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), which allows for perfect unemployment
insure across households. This, along with the assumption that there are no search costs,
implies that every unemployed household will always be searching for a job. Households
trade uncontingent bonds, aH , and shares in firms, s. Unemployed households receive
the unemployment benefit b ≥ 0 from the government and each household pays the
lump-sum tax T . We can then write the program of the representative household as:
V (S, sH) = max
c,s′,a′H
{u(c) + nν(1− h) + (1− n)ν(1) + βE[V (S′, s′H)]}
7s.t.
c+
a′H
1 + r (S)
+ p (S) s′ = w (S, sH)nh (S, sH) + (1− n)b
+ aH + [p (S) + d (S)] s− T (S)
n′ = (1− χ)n+ Ψ (S) (1− n)
S′ = G(S), c ≥ 0, No-Ponzi condition
The aggregate state of the economy is given by S = {z, ξ;K,B,N,D−}, where z is total
factor productivity and ξ is the financial shock which both evolve stochastically. K is
the aggregate capital stock, B is total bond holdings of the household sector, N is total
employment, and D− is the amount of dividends paid out last period. sH = {s, aH , n}
is the individual state, and G is the law of motion for aggregate state variables. d is the
dividend paid to shareholders, and p is the share price of the representative firm.
Wages and hours are the result of a Nash-bargaining problem between workers
and the firm at the beginning of each period, so from the household’s perspective
w (S, sH)nh (S, sH) is given before any consumption or savings decisions take place.
Since we have assumed separable utility between consumption and leisure, the intra-
household consumption level doesn’t depend on employment status as noted in Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Note that this has the implication that unemployed
households are better off than those that are employed since they receive the same con-
sumption level as those that are employed but enjoy all the leisure. This implication is
discussed in detail in Cheron and Langot (2004). The first order conditions (dropping
the dependence on states) from the household’s problem give:
1 = E
[
m′ (1 + r)
]
1 = E
[
m′
(
p′ + d′
p
)]
where m′ = βuc (c′) /uc (c) is the stochastic discount factor. These equations taken to-
gether simply give us the no-arbitrage condition between shares and bonds. All deriva-
tions of first order conditions for all agents can be found in the Appendix B.
82.2.3 Firms
We model the firm and derive an enforcement constraint similar to JQ. There exists
a representative firm with gross revenue F (z, k, nh), where z is the stochastic level
of aggregate productivity. Capital evolves according to the standard law of motion
k′ = (1− δ) k+ i, where i is investment and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the rate of depreciation. Firms
discount the future via the stochastic discount factor m′ and pay the fixed cost cv > 0
to post a vacancy. The firm also pays the equity payout cost ϕ(d, d−) to pay dividends
to shareholders. We impose this dividend adjust cost to capture the observation that
firms tend to smooth dividends as well as to formalize the financial friction. Firms use
equity and debt with debt preferred to equity due to the subsidy τ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
the effective gross interest rate that the representative firm faces every period is given
by R = 1 + r (1− τ).
After negotiating wages and hours, firms take out the intra-period loan lt to finance
working capital. Before receiving any revenue from production, the firm pays the wage
bill wnh, chooses investment, chooses the equity payout d and the associated adjustment
cost, the number of vacancies v to post, and new intertemporal debt a′F . Since all
payments are done before the realization of revenues, the firm must take out the intra-
period loan:
l = wnh+ i+ cvv + ϕ(d, d−) + aF − a
′
F
R
The firm’s budget constraint every period is
i+ aF + ϕ(d, d−) = F (z, k, nh)− wnh− cvv + a
′
F
R
It follows that the intra-period loan is simply total expected revenue, l = F (z, k, nh).
The firm has the option to default after total revenues are realized but before the
working capital loan l is paid back. At this moment in time, the firm holds liquidity
l and total liabilities l + a′F / (1 + r). Since firms can easily abscond with the liquidity
l, the lender can only recover the firm’s physical capital stock k′ with probability ξ,
which is stochastic. With probability (1− ξ), the lender’s recovery value is zero. One
can interpret this probability as the probability of finding a buyer of the firm’s capital
stock.
In the case of default, the lender and the firm can negotiate a payment after the
liquidation value of the capital stock is realized. We assume that the firm has all the
9bargaining power in this negotiation process and the lender will only get the threat
value.
If the liquidation value is zero, the lender will not shutdown the firm because it
is better off waiting for the intertemporal loan a′F to come due. The firm keeps the
liquidity l in this case. Therefore, the total ex-post value of default in the case when
the liquidation value is zero is:
l + E
[
m′J ′
]
where m′ is the stochastic discount factor and J ′ is the value of the firm tomorrow. That
is, E [m′J ′] is the expected present value of the firm if the firm continues to operate.
If the liquidation value is k′, the firm will negotiate the payment P to prevent the
lender liquidating the firm. The net surplus to the firm of avoiding liquidation is:
l + E
[
m′J ′
]− P
The lender’s net surplus of reaching an agreement is:
P +
a′F
1 + r
− k′
Assuming the firm holds all the bargaining power, the firm must pay P = k′−a′F / (1 + r)
to avoid liquidation. It follows that the total net surplus of reaching an agreement is:
l + E
[
m′J ′
]
+
a′F
1 + r
− k′
Since the liquidation value is not known until after the default takes place, when the
intra-period loan is contracted, the expected total net surplus to the firm (since it has
all the bargaining power) is
ξ
(
l + E
[
m′J ′
]
+
a′F
1 + r
− k′
)
+ (1− ξ) (l + E [m′J ′])
= ξ
(
a′F
1 + r
− k′
)
+ l + E
[
m′J ′
]
Incentive compatibility requires that the expected surplus of defaulting not exceed the
value of not defaulting. This requires that
E
[
m′J ′
] ≥ ξ( a′F
1 + r
− k′
)
+ l + E
[
m′J ′
]
ξ
(
k′ − a
′
F
1 + r
)
≥ l = F (z, k, nh)
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The firm’s ability to borrow is limited by the enforcement constraint derived above.
Higher debt in the form of either intertemporal or intratemporal loans is associated with
a tighter enforcement constraint while a higher capital stock loosens the enforcement
constraint. Since employment (due to the lack of endogenous separations), productivity,
the probability ξ, and the capital stock are given, the firm only has control over k′, a′F ,
and the intensive margin h. We refer to innovations in ξ as ‘financial shocks’ since they
directly affect the firm’s capacity to borrow from lenders. Negative innovations can be
viewed as a deterioration in credit market conditions.
We can then write the program of the representative firm as:
J(S, sF ) = max
d,k′,a′F ,v,n′
{
d+ E[m′J(S′, s′F )]
}
s.t.
k′ + aF + ϕ(d, d−) = F (z, k, nh (S, sF )) + (1− δ)k
− w (S, sF )nh (S, sF )− cvv + a
′
F
R (S)
ξ
(
k′ − a
′
F
1 + r (S)
)
≥ F (z, k, nh (S, sF ))
n′ = (1− χ)n+ Φ (S) v
S′ = G(S), k′, v ≥ 0
where sF = {k, aF , n, d−} is the individual state, R = 1+r(1−τ), and the firm’s equity
payout cost is ϕ(d, d−). Once again note that wages and hours are bargained at the
beginning of the period and are treated as given in the program described above.
The first order conditions, dropping state dependencies, for the firm’s problem gives:
1 = λϕd + E[m
′λ′ϕ′d ]
λcv = ΦE
[
m′J ′n
]
λ− γξ = E [m′ [(λ′ − γ′)F ′k + (1− δ)λ′]]
λ (1 + r)− γR = R (1 + r)E [m′λ′]
where λ and γ ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint and en-
forcement constraint, respectively. To see how these equations relate to the Andolfatto
model, set R = 1 + r, λ = 1, and γ = 0.
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2.2.4 Nash Bargaining
Wages and hours are bargained over at the beginning of each period via a Nash bargain-
ing problem between the representative household and the representative firm. Employ-
ing the notation from above, the value of an additional worker, in terms of consumption
units, to the representative household is
Vn
uc
=
ν (1− h)− ν (1)
uc
+ wh− b+ (1− χ−Ψ)β
[
V ′n
uc
]
The value to the representative firm of an additional worker is:
Jn = (λ− γ)Fnhh− λwh+ (1− χ)E
[
m′J ′n
]
where λ and γ are, again, the Lagrange multipliers on the firm’s budget constraint and
enforcement constraint, respectively. Following Andolfatto (1996), it is assumed that
the each worker is so small such that Fnh ≡ ∂F/∂ (nh) is taken as given by both the
household and the firm during the bargaining process. Given the worker’s bargaining
weight µ ∈ (0, 1), the wage and hours are the result of the Nash bargaining problem:
(w, h) = arg max
w,h
(
Vn
uc
)µ
(Jn)
1−µ
Taking the derivatives with respect to wages and hours gives us the sharing rule of
the production surplus and the static condition determining the number of hours.
µJn = λ (1− µ)
(
Vn
uc
)
ν(1−h) (1− h)
uc
=
(
1− γ
λ
)
Fnh
Using the sharing rule, µJn = λ(1 − µ)(Vn/uc), along with the definition of Vn/uc
and Jn, gives the wage bill per worker:
wh = µ
((
1− γ
λ
)
Fn + (1− χ)E
[
m′
J ′n
λ
]
+
V
1−N ΦE
[
m′
J ′n
λ′
])
+ (1− µ)
(
ν (1)− ν (1− h)
uc
+ b− (1− χ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
])
(2.1)
This is simply a weighted average of (i) the effective marginal productivity of a
worker plus the expected future value of maintaining the match plus the average dis-
counted savings to the firm of not having to post a vacancy next period and (ii) the
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endogenous outside option of the worker which is simply the forfeited leisure in terms
of consumption units as well as the unemployment benefit b minus the future value of
maintaining the match. The marginal productivity of each worker Fn is driven down
by the effective tightness of the enforcement constraint γ/λ. This is the key equation
driving our results.
According to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) (HM hereafter), in order to increase
the volatility of vacancies and employment, we need to increase the volatility of the firm’s
surplus per worker. In order to achieve this, they calibrate a low bargaining weight and
a high value of the outside option for workers. The low value of the bargaining weight
of workers makes the wage bill per worker less volatile in response to the marginal
productivity of each worker Fn. The workers’ higher outside option makes the firm’s
surplus small. These two properties taken together makes the firm’s surplus per worker
more sensitive to the marginal productivity of each worker Fn, which means firms have a
greater incentive to post vacancies. Financial frictions have a similar effect by generating
an additional wedge between the wage bill per worker and the marginal productivity
of each worker Fn. When financial frictions are present, capital is more ‘valuable’ to
the firm than an additional worker since capital has the added benefit of loosening the
enforcement constraint in this model.
In our setup, positive financial shocks and negative productivity shocks will increase
the outside option of workers endogenously. For these shocks, firms will choose to
increase hours per worker since both shocks will relax the enforcement constraint and
hours can be increased instantly unlike the stock of employees or capital. Since workers
will work more on average, the outside option of not working increases. As a result,
the firm’s surplus per worker becomes more sensitive to the marginal productivity of
each additional worker Fn, which gives the firm more of an incentive to change vacancy
postings in response to shocks.
To see the effect of the enforcement constraint on the wage bill more clearly, consider
the case in which the equity payout is simply ϕ (d, d−) = d. In this case, there are no
costs associated with adjusting the dividend and ϕd = 1/λ = 1. It follows that we can
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write the wage bill in Equation 2.1 as
wh = µ
[
(1− γ)Fn +
(
V
1−N
)
cv
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ν (1)− ν (1− h)
uc
+ b
]
Since γ ≥ 0, the tighter the enforcement constraint, the lower the effective marginal
productivity of each worker to the firm becomes. That is to say, in situations in which
the shadow price of the enforcement constraint increases, the bargaining weight shifts
away from workers to the firm due to the fact that the firm would like to decrease the
number of employees in order to loosen the enforcement constraint. However, since
there are no endogenous separations, the firm is inhibited from decreasing either the
capital stock or the stock of workers and must do so along the intensive margin. The
shadow price of our enforcement constraint will increase during positive shocks to total
factor productivity and in situation in which the credit market conditions deteriorate.
If there were no credit market frictions in our environment or during situations
in which our enforcement constraint becomes nonbinding (γ = 0), our wage bill would
collapse to the standard matching model sharing rule:
wh = µ
[
Fn +
(
V
1−N
)
cv
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ν (1)− ν (1− h)
uc
+ b
]
This last equation will correspond to the wage bill in the Andolfatto benchmark
model. The derivation of the equations above is detailed in the Appendix B.
2.2.5 Government
The government in this model simply raises revenue in order to subsidize firm’s borrow-
ing and to pay out the unemployment benefits b to the mass of unemployed households.
Therefore, the government’s budget constraint is:
T (S) =
(
1
R (S)
− 1
1 + r (S)
)
a′F (S, sF ) + (1−N) b
where S once again denotes the aggregate state of the economy.
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2.2.6 Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of functions for (i) the household’s
policies c (S, sH) , s
′ (S, sH) , and a′H (S, sH); (ii) the household’s value function V (S, sH);
(iii) the firm’s policies d (S, sF ) , k
′ (S, sF ) , a′F (S, sF ) , and v (S, sF ); (iv) the firm’s value
function J(S, sF ); (v) aggregate prices r (S) , R (S) , p (S) , and m
′ (S, S′); (vi) taxes
T (S); (vii) the law of motion for aggregate states S′ = G(S). Such that: (i) the
household’s policies are optimal and V (S, sH) satisfies the Bellman’s equation (2.1); (ii)
the firm’s policies are optimal and J(S, sF ) satisfies the Bellman’s equation (2.4); (iii)
m′ = βuc (c′) /uc (c); (iv) the government’s budget is balanced; (v) wages and hours
(w (S, sH , sF ) , h (S, sH , sF )) is the solution to the bilateral Nash bargaining problem
given by equation (2.9); (vi) markets clear, s′ = 1, a′F = a
′
H ; (vii) the law of motion
G (S) is consistent with individual decisions and the stochastic processes for z and ξ.
2.3 Calibration of the Model
We must now specify some functional forms in order to evaluate our model’s quantitative
results. We define the matching technology, the aggregate production technology and
the equity payout cost to be:
M(V, 1−N) = ωV ψ(1−N)1−ψ
F (z,K,Nh) = zKα(Nh)1−α
ϕ(d, d−) = d+ κ(d− d−)2
where ψ ∈ (0, 1) , α ∈ (0, 1) and κ ≥ 0. The representative household’s preferences take
the form:
u(c) = log(c)
ν(`) =
φ
`1−η
1−η if ` ∈ [0, 1)
φu if ` = 1
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and the stochastic processes follow an autoregressive system:(
z′
ξ′
)
= A
(
z
ξ
)
+
(
εz
εξ
)
(
εz
εξ
)
∼ N (0,Σ)
where εz and εξ are normally distributed innovations with variance-covariance matrix
Σ. We now left to determine twenty-one parameters in the model.
Our parameters can be categorized into three groups based on the way we chose
to calibrate them. The first set of parameters are predetermined outside model. The
second group is a set of parameters for the shock processes which are estimated from
the constructed Solow residual and financial shock series. The last group of parameters
consists of parameters determined endogenously in the model. We calibrate these pa-
rameters using simulated method of moments with a number of targets to be matched.
To jointly choose this group of parameters, we minimize the distance between seven
moments in the data and the in the model.
2.3.1 Predetermined Parameters
We set the unemployment benefit b = 0, so this plays no role in our analysis. We
basically follow Andolfatto (1996) for the discount factor β = 0.99, the depreciation
rate δ = 0.025, the separation rate χ = 0.15 and the matching elasticity ψ = 0.60. Since
we focus on an economy where the wage in the labor market is determined in a non-
competitive fashion, we cannot use labor share data to pin down α. Rather, we choose a
value for α = 0.64, which is common across the macroeconomic literature and it is also
the same as Andolfatto (1996). We choose the tax benefit of debt in a similar to JQ,
τ = 0.35. Finally, we set the bargaining weight of workers µ = 0.35, which is a middle
of HM (2008) and Shimer (2005). The predetermined parameters are summarized in
Table 2.2. All these parameters, with the exception of τ , will also be used within the
Andolfatto model.
2.3.2 Parameters for the Shock Processes
We construct our TFP series, zt, using our specification of the aggregate production
function. In order to construct a series of the measured Solow residual, we must first
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Parameter Description Value Remarks
β Discount factor 0.99 annual rate of return 4%
δ Depreciation rate 0.025 Andolfatto (1996)
χ Job-separation rate 0.15 Andolfatto (1996)
ψ Matching elasticity 0.60 Andolfatto (1996)
α CD parameter for capital 0.36 Andolfatto (1996)
τ Tax benefit (subsidy) 0.35 JQ (2012)
µ Bargaining weight 0.35 middle of HM and Shimer
Table 2.2: Predetermined Parameters
construct a time series for Yt,Kt, Nt, and ht. We use Current Population Survey (CPS)
data on the level of employment (Nt) and the average weekly hours worked (ht). Yt is
simply real GDP taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We construct our capital
stock using Flow of Funds data for the nonfinancial business sector and deflate the level
of investment each period by the business GDP price index taken from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Depreciation is taken to be the consumption of fixed capital of
nonfinancial business Since we only have flows of net capital expenditures and not a
level, we pick K0 in 1952 such that the capital-output ratio displays no trend. Since
we begin the recursion in 1952 and our analysis begins in 1984:Q1, it is not relevant
for our results based on the time period for our analysis. Log-linearizing our aggregate
production function gives:
zˆt = yˆt − αkˆt − (1− α) Nˆt − (1− α) hˆt
where hats denote log-deviations from a linear trend for each variable estimated over
the period 1984:Q1-2012:Q1. We normalize z¯ = 1.
For the construction of our financial shocks, we make the assumption that the en-
forcement constraint is always binding. Of course, the validity of this assumption is
critical for the construction of our financial shock series. We verify ex-post: after con-
structing the series for the shocks and feeding them into the model to verify that the
Lagrange multiplier is always strictly greater than zero. This assumption is strong
and open for debate. However, we feel that viewing the nonfinancial business sector in
the aggregate as always being constrained is not an outrageous assumption to make.
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Log-linearizing the enforcement constraint (equation (2.4)), gives us:
ξˆt =
ξ¯b¯e
y¯
bˆet+1 −
ξ¯k¯
y¯
kˆt+1 + yˆt
where we construct bˆet+1 using Flow of Funds data for net borrowing in credit market
instruments in the nonfinancial business sector deflated by the business GDP price index.
yˆt in this case is not total GDP but real business GDP. Details of the data can be found
in the Appendix B. The capital stock is as defined previously. We fix b¯e/y¯ = 3.37
to match the liabilities-output ratio over our sample period. This, in turn, gives us
ξ¯k¯/y¯ = 1.4362 and ξ¯b¯e/y¯ = 0.4361. We then use the constructed series for zˆt and ξˆt and
estimate a vector-autoregressive process over the time period 1984:Q1-2012:Q1. This
gives us the matrix of coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix:
A
(
z
ξ
)
=
(
0.9910 −0.0351
0.2403 0.8978
)(
z
ξ
)
Σ =
(
0.00502 0.000027
0.000027 0.00792
)
For our Andolfatto benchmark model without financial frictions, we simply have a
AR(1) process for the productivity given by:
ρz = 0.9426
V ar (εz) = 0.0051
2
2.3.3 Parameters Determined Using Targets
For our remaining seven parameters, we use the simulated method of moments to min-
imize the distance between seven moments from the data and from the model. Our
seven targets are:
1. Frisch elasticity of hours for those employed: 0.5
2. Steady-state employment to population ratio: 62%
3. Steady-state hours per worker: 0.39 (weekly potential hours assumed to be 100)
4. Steady-state job-filling rate: 90%
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5. Vacancy expenditures-output ratio: 2.18%
6. Debt to GDP ratio: 3.37
7. Standard deviation of the equity payout-GDP ratio: 1.39
Parameter Description KS Andolfatto
η Curvature parameter for leisure 3.1166 3.1166
φ Scale parameter for leisure 0.7814 0.7797
φu Leisure for unemployed 0.2525 0.2554
cv Cost of posting a vacancy 0.1960 0.1875
ω Matching efficiency 0.5349 0.5349
ξ Mean of credit process 0.1294 –
κ Equity payout cost 0.1460 –
Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameters
According to Silva and Toledo (2009), the average cost of time spent hiring an ad-
ditional worker is approximately 3.6%-4.3% of total labor costs. We target the median,
3.9%, of these estimates. In terms of our model, this implies cvvΦwnh = 0.039, which in
turn gives cvvy = 0.218 given our targets for the job-filling rate Φ = 0.9 and the labor
share = 0.62, which is the average labor share over our sample period. κ is chosen to
have a standard deviation of the equity payout-GDP ratio generated by the model equal
to that of data.
For the calibration of the Andolfatto model, we omit the last two targets listed above
from the calibration since κ and ξ¯ are not present in that model environment. These
targets result in the set of parameters reported in Table 2.3 for both our model (KS
model, which stands for Kim and Seliski) and the Andolfatto model.
2.4 Results & Discussion
We solve both the KS and Andolfatto models using second order approximation around
the steady-state. The derivation of the nonlinear equations characterizing both models’
equilibriums can be found in the Appendix. We first show the resulting impulse response
functions resulting from a one standard deviation shock to TFP for the KS model in
order to develop some intuition underlying our results. This is shown in Figure 2.1.
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2.4.1 Innovations to Productivity
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Figure 2.1: IRFs to a one standard deviation shock to TFP
When a productivity shock hits the KS model economy, the enforcement constraint
instantly tightens. Since the stock of employees and capital are fixed, firms can only
loosen the constraint via hours per worker and investing in a higher kt+1. Hours in
the model respond immediately because they can substitute for bodies that cannot
be increased due to the nature of the hiring process. Once employees are separated
exogenously, hours per worker quickly recovers back to its steady-state level.
In response to a positive productivity shock, the firm allocates resources away from
labor input by decreasing both wages and hours and allocating the savings towards
investment. This is consistent with the countercyclical nature of the labor share reported
earlier. The shift in bargaining power is due to the shock increasing the ratio of the
Lagrange multipliers, effectively lowering the marginal product of each worker to the
firm. The reason for the firm allocating more resources to capital is as follows. After
a tightening of the enforcement constraint, capital is deemed more ‘valuable’ to the
firm because investment in capital tomorrow loosens the constraint. That is, labor and
capital are imperfect substitutes not only due to their role in the production process,
but also due to the added benefit of the higher capital stock loosening the enforcement
constraint. The firm wishes to build up capital initially to loosen the constraint for future
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periods in order to take advantage of the persistence in the positive productivity shock.
After employment begins to move (since it cannot move immediately), both wages
and hours recover after the firm has effectively loosened the enforcement constraint by
accumulating a higher capital stock.
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Figure 2.2: Shadow price response to a TFP shock
To gain some insight of the effects on the effective marginal product per worker,
recall from the wage bargaining solution that (1− γ/λ)Fn is the effective benefit to
the firm of employing an additional worker. The interpretation of γ/λ is the shadow
price of the enforcement constraint discounted by the firm’s marginal cost of financing
operations via equity. The deviations of the effective shadow price are shown in Figure
2.2.
The kinks are due to the frictional nature of employment (employment cannot ad-
just when the shock is initially realized). While the shadow price associated with the
constraint is quite high initially, it quickly drops off as the firm accumulates capital
in order to loosen the constraint. Once the constraint has been loosened, due to the
higher capital stock kt+1, the firm begins to accumulate employees once again by posting
vacancies.
Figure 2.3 shows how the firms finance their operations and how much of their
resources are devoted to hiring purposes following a productivity shock. Once again,
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Figure 2.3: Firms’ response to a TFP shock
the kink is the result of the lagged nature of employment. Initially, the firm finance
their capital accumulation not only by reducing labor inputs and labor costs, but also
via reductions in equity payouts. The firms use internal finances briefly to accumulate
capital resources. It is noteworthy that equity payouts reach their peak over a year
after the TFP innovation. This can be viewed as the firm paying out the highest
dividends once it has adjusted both employment and capital to a situation in which
the enforcement constraint’s shadow price reaches its minimum deviation. Dividend
payouts reach its peak around the same time that γ/λ reaches its minimum deviation.
That is, the opportunity cost associated with diverting resources to dividend payments
is at its lowest level.
2.4.2 Innovations to Credit Conditions
We now consider the situations in which our model economy is hit by a negative one
standard deviation financial shock. The dynamics are shown in Figure 2.4. Similar to
the productivity case, investment is hit hardest by an innovation to the financial process.
As the firm faces a tighter enforcement constraint due to the negative financial shock,
it immediately cuts hours, wages and investment. Since the firm cannot immediately
adjust employment, employment does not drop until the period after the shock. One
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Figure 2.4: IRFs to a negative one standard deviation financial shock
of the key differences between the financial shock and the productivity shock, is the
speed at which the economy recovers to its steady-state levels. This is in contrast to
many findings that periods of financial distress lead to prolonged recessions. As in the
positive productivity case, a negative financial shock shifts bargaining power away from
the worker. Again, this is due to the tightness of the borrowing constraint driving down
the effective marginal product of an additional worker to the firm.
The effective shadow price of the enforcement constraint, shown in Figure 2.5, dis-
plays a very similar pattern to the positive productivity shock case but drops off faster
to return near to its steady-state ratio. Workers quickly recover their bargaining po-
sition as the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers recovers towards its steady-state level.
The most pronounced difference between the productivity and financial shock cases
is the movement of financial variables, which one would expect. The firm decreases
its debt position and continues to decrease it for some time after the financial shock.
The firm also reduces its equity payouts but eventually increases them after some time.
This is consistent with the observation that both equity payouts and debt positions
are reduced during periods of financial turmoil as reported in JQ. To highlight the
contributions of each shock to key variables, we report the variance decomposition of
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Figure 2.5: Shadow price response to a financial shock
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Periods After a Negative Financial Shock
Lo
g−
De
via
tio
ns
 fr
om
 S
te
ad
y−
St
at
e
 
 
Vacancies
Dividends
Debt
Figure 2.6: Firms’ response to a negative financial shock
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each shock in Table 2.4.
Variable zˆ ξˆ
Output 86.20 13.80
Total Hours 63.99 36.01
Employment 83.36 16.64
Hours per Worker 8.44 91.56
Wages 76.38 23.62
Labor Productivity 85.73 14.27
Labor Share 19.15 80.85
Vacancies 61.09 38.91
Equity Payouts/GDP 45.74 54.26
Debt Repurchases/GDP 48.69 51.31
Table 2.4: Variance Decomposition (percent)
Financial shocks have a substantial impact on the volatility of both hours per worker
and the labor share. The effects of financial shocks on the volatility of output and em-
ployment are relatively low. Despite equity and debt being financial variables, the
impact of financial shocks on these is relatively similar to productivity shocks. While
productivity shocks are still the main source of fluctuations along the extensive margin
and seem to be the key driver in overall business cycle fluctuations, the impact of finan-
cial shocks is far from negligible on hours worked per worker. Financial shocks account
for 36% of the volatility in total hours worked, mostly due to the impact of financial
shocks on hours worked per worker. This, along with the fact that vacancies, hours,
and the labor share are quite sensitive to financial shocks, provides evidence that incor-
porating financial shocks into a matching model results in a measurable improvement
in the overall understanding of labor market fluctuations.
2.4.3 Comparing Results
We now compare our results to the Andolfatto model (model without financial frictions)
to see what gains and what shortcomings the incorporation of financial frictions provides.
Both the KS and Andolfatto models are simulated for 350 periods 500 times. Eighty-
eight periods of data are burned in order to strip out the importance of initial values. All
variables, except debt repurchases and equity payouts, are then logged and HP-filtered
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with a smoothing parameter of 1600. The main business cycle statistics for both models
are reported in Table 2.5.
The addition of financial shocks into the matching model has a marked impact on
key labor market variables. While the Andolfatto model generates high employment
volatility, it is still orders of magnitude less than the data. The KS model improves
the model’s performance along this dimension. We are able to match the volatility of
total hours and labor productivity quite well. However, our model performs poorly in
replicating movements in wages and capturing the countercyclical nature of the labor
share. Additionally, while the data has the intensive margin accounting for 32% of the
variation in total hours worked, the KS model delivers 53%, overstating the importance
of hours worked per worker while the Andolfatto model delivers only 14%.
Despite these shortcomings, our results comport to a greater extent with actual
data than the Andolfatto model, indicating that the addition of financial frictions and
financial shocks have a positive impact on matching moments from the data. This, taken
together with the variance decomposition implies that financial shocks are an important
dimension to incorporate into standard matching models. Our credit channel shows up
through the multipliers associated with the enforcement constraint which drives down
the marginal benefit of employees to firms. Financial frictions generate an additional
wedge between the wage bill per worker and the marginal productivity of each worker Fn.
Capital is more ‘valuable’ to the firm than an additional worker in this environment since
capital has the additional benefit of loosening the enforcement constraint. This makes
both investment and hours per worker sensitive to shocks originating in the financial
sector or from TFP. Despite improving some labor market variables’ volatilities via
financial shocks, we are still quite far off from replicating the volatility displayed in the
data, especially for vacancies.
2.5 Conclusion
Does the incorporation of financial shocks into a standard matching model better our
understanding of fluctuations in hours, employment, and wages? Our analysis suggests
that there are gains to be made by accounting for such shocks in a standard matching
model. We proposed a model that uses Andolfatto as a our benchmark matching model
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and incorporate financial frictions and shocks into the environment similar to JQ. Within
our model, we show that the credit channel has marked impacts on key labor variables
via the shifting of bargaining power from workers to firms through the effective shadow
price on the enforcement constraint.
Comparing our results to the Andolfatto model, calibrated to hit the same targets,
demonstrates that our model can better replicate business cycle moments. Moreover,
a variance decomposition of the shocks suggests that financial shocks play an impor-
tant role in the fluctuation of both hours per worker and the labor share. While our
results still support the notion that business cycle fluctuations are still largely due to
productivity shocks, it also suggests that future research that employs a matching model
framework should seriously consider the incorporation of financial shocks as well as the
intensive margin to account for movements in key labor market variables. Without the
incorporation of financial shocks, movements in employment, hours per worker, and the
labor share are relatively muted over the business cycle.
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σx% ρ (x,Output) ρ (xt, xt−1)
Variable (x) Data KS Andolfatto Data KS Andolfatto Data KS Andolfatto
Output 1.12 1.15 0.94 – – – 0.97 0.78 0.81
Total Hours 1.26 0.94 0.50 0.85 0.86 0.93 0.89 0.66 0.90
Employment 0.88 0.60 0.45 0.82 0.77 0.81 0.93 0.83 0.86
Hours per Worker 0.45 0.64 0.14 0.77 0.54 0.72 0.61 0.15 0.48
Wages 0.91 0.62 0.41 -0.18 0.78 0.96 0.77 0.33 0.67
Labor Productivity 0.66 0.58 0.51 0.07 0.58 0.94 0.59 0.59 0.58
Labor Share 0.73 0.79 0.13 -0.28 0.18 -0.67 0.78 0.27 0.44
Vacancies 11.26 3.73 2.60 0.86 0.71 0.72 0.91 0.31 0.45
Equity Payouts/GDP 1.39 1.39 – 0.69 0.70 – 0.91 0.89 –
Debt Repurchases/GDP 2.23 2.07 – -0.84 -0.78 – 0.93 0.88 –
Table 2.5: Business Cycle Moments
Chapter 3
Unemployment Dynamics in
Europe: The Roles of the Ins and
Outs
3.1 Introduction
The search and matching model of unemployment developed by Mortsensen and Pis-
sarides (1994) has become the standard framework for studying unemployment in the
macroeconomy. This model has two key variables driving flows into and out of the pool
of unemployed: (i) the job-finding rate (outflow rate) and the (ii) separation rate (inflow
rate). Just how important is the cyclicality of the job-finding rate versus the separation
rate in understanding unemployment variability over a country’s business cycle? Hall
(2005) and Shimer (2012) have argued that unemployment fluctuations in the United
States are almost entirely driven by variation in the job-finding rate. As a result, most
macroeconomic models studying unemployment have assumed that the separation rate
is acyclical, largely ignoring labor market models with a role for endogenous separations.
Others have cautioned against this assumption (Elsby, Michaels, and Solon, 2009; Fujita
and Ramey, 2009).
This paper studies labor market outcomes across a number of European countries
and the US at business cycle frequencies. In particular, it constructs a quarterly measure
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of unemployment flows and evaluates the contribution of the job-finding and separation
rates to the dynamics of the unemployment rate in each country. The methodology
popularized by Shimer (2005, 2012) and Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013) is used to
construct quarterly inflows and outflows from unemployment using publicly available
labor force survey data.
Whereas the best comparable, cross-country estimates for the rates of inflow to and
outflow from unemployment are annual, this study adds to the existing literature by
creating quarterly estimates of the hazard rates across 19 European countries and the
US using the methodology developed by Shimer (2012). This allows me to study the
two key inputs of the search and matching model at business cycle frequencies. I then
quantify the contribution of the job-finding and separation rates to the dynamics of
unemployment in each country, which is the primary contribution of this paper. While
fluctuations in the job-finding rate accounted for about 76% of the variability of the
unemployment rate in the US, in the EU-15,1 it accounted for roughly 61%, leaving
a much larger role for the separation rate in European countries. This supports the
findings of Hobijn and Sahin (2009) and Elsby et al. (2013) and reinforces the view
that the US is the exception rather than the rule. Unlike the US, taking account of
variations in the separation rate is critical for understanding unemployment variabil-
ity in most European countries. Therefore, if one is interested in understanding how
unemployment evolves across European countries, models with endogenous separations
should be employed.
This paper is most closely related to Elsby et al. (2013), but their annual estimates
of the job-finding and separation rates smooth out high frequency fluctuations in the
separation rates, thereby understating the role of separation rates. Their study also ig-
nores many breaks in the underlying unemployment duration data used in their sample.
Since many of the European countries used in their analysis had substantial breaks in
the labor force surveys prior to 2004, results reported in Elsby et al. (2013) may be
biased due to breaks in the underlying time series. I avoid this issue by restricting my
sample to cover only the periods after 2004.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data
1 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
30
and methodology used for the construction of quarterly hazard rates across a sample
of European countries and the US. Section 3.3 does a cross-country analysis of the
estimated hazard rates and decomposes unemployment fluctuations in each country.
Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Data and Analytical Framework
Data from the European Labor Force Survey (LFS) and from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) for the US are used to produce quarterly estimates of flow hazard rates
into and out of the pool of unemployed. In everything that follows, I restrict my analysis
to the working age population, which I take to be those aged 15 to 64.2 This study
adopts the methodology pioneered by Shimer (2012) to construct implicit labor market
flows. In order to employ this methodology and obtain simple measures of monthly
hazard rates, two strong assumptions are made: (i) workers can only be in one of
two states, unemployed or employed; (ii) all unemployed workers have the same job
finding probability and all employed workers have the same exit probability. The first
assumption rules out any movements into or out of the labor force while the second
assumption rules out any heterogeneity among the employed or unemployed.
With regard to the first assumption, Shimer (2012) demonstrates that movements
into and out of inactivity over the business cycle are dominated by movements between
unemployment and employment, therefore accounting for the inactive state did not
quantitatively change his main findings using US data. Elsby et al. (2013) also note
that allowing for inactivity does not significantly change the results for their cross-
country analysis in a quantitatively important way. However, ignoring the inactive
state is not necessarily a benign assumption to make for European countries. In fact,
as can be seen in Figure 3.1, almost 15% of those classified as inactive in the EU-8 3
in 2006 transitioned into the labor force a year later. Since we cannot observe the flows
into and out of the inactive state without having access to the relevant microdata, we
cannot proceed with the analysis without making the first simplifying assumption.
As for the second assumption, estimating heterogenous hazard rates is not feasible
2 16 to 64 for the US.
3 Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and the UK.
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Status in 2007
Status in 2006 Employed Unemployed Inactive
Employed 94.7 2.5 2.8
Unemployed 32.5 54.2 13.3
Inactive 10.5 4.4 85.2
Table 3.1: Transition matrix, EU-8, 2006-2007 (%). Source: Table copied from Euro-
pean Commission (2009, p. 63).
without access to the appropriate microdata. Since unemployment duration data is
the primary measure used to construct the job-finding rate, a cautionary consideration
is the potential of duration dependence among the pool of unemployed. Elsby et al.
(2013) use both quarterly and annual data and propose a means to test for duration
dependence across a large set of OECD countries. It is worth emphasizing that the
definition of duration dependence is a broad one and makes no distinction between
duration dependence, which has a causal effect on the job-finding rate, and duration
dependence that arises purely due to selection bias (i.e., the worst workers are left over).
Elsby et al. (2013) find only weak evidence for duration dependence in the job-finding
rate in Continental European countries and use an optimally weighted estimate to create
a more ‘precise’ estimate of the job-finding rate using annual unemployment duration
data. This paper uses quarterly unemployment duration data to construct quarterly
measures of the hazard rates in each economy, so it is unnecessary to implement their
optimal weighting procedure.
3.2.1 Labor Flow Accounting
This section closely follows Shimer (2012). Time is continuous but data is only collected
at discrete dates t ∈ {0, d, 2d, . . .} where d > 0 is an integer and represents the distance
in time units between data collection dates. The labor force is constant and normalized
to one, lt ≡ et+ut = 1, ∀t, where et and ut denote the stock of employed and unemployed
at time t, respectively. Within the period, defined as the interval [t, t+d), all unemployed
workers find a job according to a Poisson process with constant arrival rate ft ≥ 0 and
all employed workers separate from their current job according to a Poisson process
with constant arrival rate st ≥ 0. These hazard rates are assumed to be constant within
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each interval [t, t+ d). I refer to ft as the job-finding rate or outflow rate and st as the
separation rate4 or inflow rate throughout the remainder of this paper.
Fix t and let j ∈ [0, d] be the time that has elapsed since our last discrete time
observation. Define ust (j) as the stock of short-term unemployed between observations.
They are the workers that were unemployed at time (t+ j), but were employed at some
point within the interval [t, t + j]. By construction, ust (0) = 0 for all t. Thus, the
evolution of the stock of unemployed and short-term unemployed between observations
is governed by the following system of equations:
u˙t+j = stet+j − ftut+j (3.1)
u˙st (j) = stet+j − ftust (j) (3.2)
Modeling flows in a continuous time environment such as this allows me to ignore any
time aggregation bias that may result in my measure of the rates. Workers can poten-
tially switch between states multiple times between observations when flows are modeled
in this manner and is reflected in the above system of equations. Issues arising from
time aggregation bias are discussed at length in Elsby et al. (2009) and Shimer (2012).
Substituting for stet+j in Equation 3.1 above and solving the differential equation with
initial condition ut gives:
[u˙t+j − u˙st (j)] + ft[ut+j − ust (j)] = 0
By definition, ust (0) = 0. Therefore, given the the observations ut and ut+d, the solution
to this differential equation is:
ut+d = e
−ftdut + ust (d) (3.3)
where ust (d) is the stock of unemployed workers who have been unemployed for no more
than d units of time. Shimer (2012) uses monthly unemployment duration data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) to back out the hazard rate ft each month. In the
context of his study, ust (1) would represent the stock of those who have been unemployed
for four weeks or less. Therefore, using Equation 3.3, the probability that a worker that
4 Elsby et al. (2013) stress that this is a bit of a misnomer since a separation is typically defined as
a layoff or quit. When workers flow from inactivity to being unemployed it would be incorrect to label
these transitions as ‘separations’.
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was unemployed in period t, i.e. at the beginning of the interval [t, t+ d), finds at least
one job by period (t+ d) can be written as:
Ft(d) ≡ ut − e
−ftdut
ut
= 1− ut+d − u
s
t (d)
ut
(3.4)
It is worth stressing that this is not the probability that an unemployed person is em-
ployed at the beginning of period (t + d), but is the probability a person that was
unemployed had at least one spell of employment within the interval between observa-
tions. The monthly job-finding rate is related to the probability of finding a job within
the interval [t, t + d) through the mapping ft = −ln(1 − Ft)/d. Since I have assumed
that the labor force is constant and normalized to one, we can write the differential
Equation 3.1 d time units forward as:
u˙t+d + (st + ft)ut+d = st
The solution to this linear first order differential equation with initial condition ut is:
ut+d =
(
1− e−(st+ft)d
)
st
st + ft
+ ute
−(st+ft)d (3.5)
Once I estimate ft, I can obtain estimates of st by solving this nonlinear equation, given
data for ut and ut+d. This equation also characterizes the out of steady-state dynamics
of the unemployment rate for a given initial unemployment rate and the inflow and
outflow rates, st and ft. The current unemployment is a convex combination of the
previous unemployment rate and the within period steady-state:
ut+d = λtu
∗
t + (1− λt)ut (3.6)
where the rate of convergence λt and the steady-state within the period are defined as,
λt ≡ 1− e−(st+ft)d
u∗t ≡
st
st + ft
The higher the rate of turnover in an economy, (st + ft), the faster the economy will
adjust to its steady-state unemployment rate within the period [t, t + d). Thus, if a
shock hits either of the flow hazard rates, not only will it change the new steady-state
unemployment rate, it will also affect the rate at which the economy will converge to
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this new steady-state. If job turnover is low, or equivalently, if λt is small, then the
unemployment rate from last period will persist into the current period because the
labor market will only slowly adjust towards its new steady-state unemployment rate.
Equation 3.6 provides one with a useful analytical framework in which we can decompose
fluctuations in a country’s unemployment rate and attribute it to variations in the
job-finding rate and to variations in the separation rate. This equation provides the
cornerstone of my analysis of the cross-country differences in quarterly unemployment
dynamics.
3.2.2 Data
While Shimer (2012) was able to exploit unemployment duration data at monthly fre-
quencies for his study of the US labor market, publicly available unemployment duration
data from the European LFS are only available at quarterly frequencies. Elsby et al.
(2013) use both annual and quarterly data on unemployment to estimate their hazard
rates. For my analysis, I will use quarterly European LFS and CPS data from 2004:Q1-
2015:Q1. I will now briefly describe the data used and the adjustments made for this
paper as well as discuss some of the limitations when using European LFS data.
Prior to 1997, the European LFS was only conducted once in the spring each year.5
Since 1998, EU countries gradually moved to a quarterly continuous survey with
reference weeks spread uniformly throughout each quarter. By 2004, most countries had
already adopted the continuous survey with the exception of Germany. In an effort to
derive the most comparable hazard rates for cross-country analysis, I only use data after
most countries had already adopted the quarterly continuous survey. One limitation of
employing the methodology described in Elsby et al. (2013) is that the unemployment
rate and unemployment duration data are not those observed at end of a quarter, due to
the continuous nature of the survey. Households are uniformly sampled throughout the
quarter and without access to the appropriate microdata, we cannot say that the data
reported is in fact the observation at the end of the quarter. Instead, these time series
should be viewed as quarterly averages and not end of quarter observations. While this
is a rather fine detail, it is worth mentioning since it is necessary to treat the data as
5 Data were typically collected in the 2nd quarter. France and Poland conducted their spring surveys
in the 1st quarter.
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an ‘end of quarter’ observation in order to apply the methodology of Shimer (2012) and
Elsby et al. (2013). For this very reason, I also avoid using those unemployed for less
than one month as my primary metric for estimating the job-finding rate. Instead, I
use data representing those unemployed for less than three months.
When using unemployment duration data from the European LFS, two adjustments
must be made. First, the European LFS counts individuals who have already found jobs
and will start working within a period of at most 3 months as unemployed. This shows
up in the unemployment duration data as ‘Not Started’, which is normally lumped in
with those who have been unemployed for less than 1 month, as is done in the OECD
dataset. This is problematic in the sense that it provides no information about how long
those unemployed workers were searching prior to securing a job. In most countries,
the share of the unemployed classified as ‘Not Started’ is negligible. However, the share
of unemployed in Italy classified in this manner averaged 2% since 2004. I address
this problem by omitting this group of unemployed when calculating the incidence of
unemployment by duration.
Additionally, I must take stock of unemployed individuals who did not respond to
the duration question. This is potentially a more serious problem than the ‘Not Started’
one as a number of countries have classified a non-negligible share of their unemployed
as ‘No Response’ as can be seen in Table 3.2. Again, I deal with this problem by
omitting this group of unemployed when calculating the incidence of unemployment by
duration, but it is useful to be aware of the shortcomings that could potentially lead
towards biased estimates of the hazard rates.
Using Equation 3.4 from above and taking a period to be a month, we can write the
probability that an unemployed worker exits unemployment by the end of the quarter
as:
Ft(3) = 1− ut+3 − u
s
t (3)
ut
where ust (3) denotes the stock of short-term unemployed workers with duration less than
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1 ≤ d 3 ≤ d 6 ≤ d Not No
Country d < 1 < 3 < 6 < 12 d ≥ 12 Started Response
Austria 9.5 23.9 20.1 19.4 27.2 – –
Belgium 3.6 15.0 15.2 16.2 49.9 – –
Czech Republic 7.6 14.2 15.4 19.3 43.6 – –
Denmark 16.5 21.9 19.2 15.6 25.1 1.5 –
Finland 16.3 26.3 19.2 14.2 22.1 – 1.1
France 4.6 15.9 16.4 18.6 43.9 – 0.7
Germany 9.8 16.1 14.1 15.2 44.0 – 0.8
Greece 2.1 6.2 7.6 10.3 73.4 0.4 –
Hungary 11.4 9.3 12.4 19.5 47.4 – –
Ireland 4.4 10.5 10.9 14.2 58.2 – 1.7
Italy 2.7 9.9 11.8 12.2 60.7 1.6 1.1
Netherlands 6.1 17.3 16.7 19.2 38.6 – 2.0
Norway 15.5 27.7 16.8 13.5 21.7 – 4.7
Poland 9.9 10.0 17.6 19.8 42.7 – –
Portugal 3.8 11.7 10.7 14.3 59.5 – –
Slovakia 2.3 6.6 7.5 13.4 70.3 – –
Slovenia 2.2 12.3 14.0 17.0 54.5 – –
Spain 5.9 13.4 12.8 15.0 52.8 – –
UK 11.8 19.7 15.6 16.2 35.6 0.9 0.2
US 25.8 25.5 15.7 10.5 22.6 – –
EU-15 6.4 14.2 13.7 15.2 49.6 0.4 0.6
Table 3.2: Incidence of Unemployment by Duration (%), 2014. Annual average. The
duration d is measured in months and the population are those aged 15-64 except for
the US, which is 16-64. Source: Eurostat, BLS
three months. I estimate the hazards rates with the following two equations:
ft = −1
3
ln
(
(1− share<3t+3)
ut+3
ut
)
(3.7)
ut+3 =
(
1− e−3(st+ft)
)
st
st + ft
+ e−3(st+ft)ut (3.8)
where share<3t+3 = u
s
t (3)/ut+3, denotes the proportion of those unemployed at time (t+3),
i.e. the next quarter, who have been unemployed for less than three months. Since the
raw data displays a large degree of seasonality, the unemployment rates and the share of
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short-term unemployed are both seasonally adjusted6 prior to estimating the monthly
hazard rates ft and st. The job-finding hazard rate is then estimated using the seasonally
adjusted unemployment duration data for those unemployed for less than three months
and the seasonally adjusted time series of the unemployment rates. Once ft is obtained,
one can then pin down the separation hazard rate, st, by solving the nonlinear equation
above. I create measures using this procedure for 19 European countries as well as the
EU-15.
To create the most comparable estimates, I use the same procedure to generate
estimates for the US using CPS data. I do not adjust the pool of short-term unemployed
as is done in Shimer (2012) and Elsby et al. (2013) to account for the 1994 CPS redesign.
This results in an overall lower job-finding estimate for the US in my analysis compared
to their estimates.
3.3 Labor Market Flows
A summary of the average values of ft, st, steady-state unemployment estimates u
∗
t ,
and actual unemployment rates for those aged 15-647 in my sample of 19 European
countries, the US, and the EU-15 are shown in Table 3.3.
Over the period 2005:Q2-2015:Q1, the average probability of an unemployed worker
in the EU-15 flowing into employment within a month was 9.5% and the probability of
an employed worker flowing into unemployment within a month was 1%. The median
monthly unemployment outflow rate across my sample of 19 European countries was
8.1% and the median inflow rate was 0.8%, with the Nordic countries displaying the
highest inflow rates. This comports with Elsby et al. (2013)’s set of annual results.
European countries’ labor markets are, relative to the US, less dynamic. The rate
of total job turnover, (st + ft), ranges from an average high of 22.7% in Norway to a
low of 3.9% in Slovakia. The rate of total job turnover in the US is roughly 30%. This
indicates that the half-life of a deviation from steady-state unemployment would be
close to 3 months in Norway, 18 months in Slovakia, and close to 2 months in the US.
Out of steady-state unemployment rates are quite persistent in Europe. Steady-state
6 This is achieved using the Census X-13 seasonal adjustment method in Eviews 9.
7 16-64 for the US.
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Outflow Inflow Turnover Unemployment
Country Rate (ft) Rate (st) (st + ft) u
∗
t =
st
ft+st
Rate (ut)
Austria 14.6 0.8 15.4 5.2 5.1
Belgium 8.1 0.7 8.8 8.5 8.0
Czech Republic 7.3 0.5 7.8 6.6 6.7
Denmark 18.6 1.1 19.7 5.9 5.9
Finland 19.4 1.7 21.1 8.0 8.0
France 10.9 1.1 12.0 9.2 9.1
Germany* 9.2 0.7 9.8 6.9 7.3
Greece 5.2 1.0 6.2 17.8 15.5
Hungary 6.3 0.6 6.9 9.5 8.9
Ireland 7.7 0.8 8.5 10.4 9.8
Italy 6.6 0.6 7.3 9.8 8.9
Netherlands 10.9 0.6 11.5 5.1 4.9
Norway 21.9 0.8 22.7 3.4 3.4
Poland 7.8 0.8 8.6 10.3 11.2
Portugal 6.4 0.9 7.2 12.2 11.3
Slovakia 3.4 0.5 3.9 14.5 13.5
Slovenia 7.0 0.5 7.5 8.1 7.3
Spain 12.6 2.2 14.8 17.6 17.0
UK 14.9 1.0 15.9 6.6 6.6
US 27.3 1.9 29.2 6.9 6.9
EU-15* 9.9 1.0 10.9 9.4 9.2
Table 3.3: Sample Average Hazard Rates (%), 2004:Q2-2015:Q1. Note: The population
are those aged 15-64 except for the US, which is 16-64; *Germany and EU-15 start in
2005:Q2. Source: Eurostat, BLS, author’s calculations
unemployment will not be a good approximation to the actual unemployment rate for
many European countries since the quarterly rate of convergence is substantially lower
than one.
3.3.1 Decomposition of Unemployment Dynamics
Since most European countries will not converge quickly to their within quarter steady-
state unemployment rate, conventional techniques to decompose unemployment fluctu-
ations into fluctuations in the job-finding rate and fluctuations in the separation rate
are not appropriate. Elsby et al. (2013) devise a convenient way to decompose these
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fluctuations even when the unemployment rate is out of its steady-state. The out of
steady-state dynamics within a quarter can we written as:
ut+3 =
(
1− e−3(st+ft)
)
st
st + ft
+ e−3(st+ft)ut (3.9)
= λtu
∗
t + (1− λt)ut (3.10)
We can log-linearize this equation around the trend values st = s¯t, ft = f¯t, and ut = u¯t,
which yields
lnut+3 ' ln u¯t+3 + λ¯t(1− u¯t+3)
[
ln
(
st
s¯t
)
− ln
(
ft
f¯t
)]
+ (1− λ¯t) ln
(
ut
u¯t
)
(3.11)
where the trend rate of convergence is defined as λ¯t = 1− e−(s¯t+f¯t). We can rewrite this
in terms of log-deviations, xˆ = lnx− ln x¯, from trend
uˆt+3 ' λ¯t(1− u¯t+3)
[
sˆt − fˆt
]
+ (1− λ¯t)uˆt (3.12)
Deviations from trend unemployment are a convex combination of current log-deviations
in the both the separation and job-finding rates as well as past log-deviations from
trend unemployment. If an economy’s trend turnover (s¯t + f¯t) is high, then λ¯t ' 1 and
Equation 3.12 reduces to the standard steady-state decomposition for unemployment
fluctuations and fluctuations in unemployment will only depend on contemporaneous
deviations in the hazard rates. Since turnover is quite low in most of Europe, past
deviations in unemployment will persist into the current period, so we need to take
account of ‘spillovers’ in deviations from previous periods into the current unemployment
deviation. We are primarily interested in the flow hazard rates’ contributions, so we
can write Equation 3.12 recursively as
uˆt+3 = C
s
t + C
f
t + C
0
t + εt (3.13)
where Cft, Cst, and C0t denote the cumulative contributions at time t of contemporane-
ous and past variation in the hazard rates as well as the initial deviation from trend at
some arbitrary initial period t = 0 and a residual, εt+3. These cumulative contributions
are written recursively as
Cst = (1− λ¯t)Cst−3 + λ¯t(1− u¯t+3)sˆt (3.14)
Cft = (1− λ¯t)Cft−3 − λ¯t(1− u¯t+3)fˆt (3.15)
C0t = (1− λ¯t)C0t−3 (3.16)
40
with initial conditions Cs0 = C
f
0 = 0 and C
0
0 = uˆ3. Written this way, variation in the
unemployment rate depends on the contemporaneous fluctuation in the hazards rates as
well as lagged variation in the hazard rates. It will also depend on the initial deviation
uˆ3 and the residual term.
As in Fujita and Ramey (2009), this linear representation of deviations in the un-
employment rate allows me to attribute variability in unemployment to variability in
the separate components on the right-hand side of Equation 3.13. The variation in
unemployment is
V ar
(
uˆt+3
)
= Cov
(
Cst , uˆt+3
)
+ Cov
(
Cft , uˆt+3
)
+ Cov
(
C0t , uˆt+3
)
+ Cov
(
εt, uˆt+3
)
(3.17)
Dividing both sides by the variance in unemployment deviations allows me to write the
decomposition in terms of each term’s share:
1 = βs + βf + β0 + βε
where
βx =
Cov
(
Cxt , uˆt+3
)
V ar
(
uˆt+3
)
for each series x ∈ {s, f, 0} as well as the residual term. The β’s capture the amount of
variation that can be attributed to each underlying series through its direct correlation
with unemployment deviations and its cross correlations with other series.
The series for st and ft are HP filtered with a standard smoothing parameter of
1600. What remains to be determined is the initial deviation in the unemployment
rate, uˆ3. I set this to be the initial deviation of the HP filtered unemployment rate
series but use Equation 3.13 to construct deviations in unemployment thereafter. In
an effort to reduce endpoint bias in the HP filtered series and reduce the impact of the
assumed initial deviation in unemployment, I omit the first four observations and the
last four observations when calculating the contributions and summary statistics. The
main results for the period 2005:Q1-2014:Q1 are reported in Table 3.4.
As previously noted in the literature, fluctuations in unemployment at business cycle
frequencies in the US are primarily driven by deviations in the job-finding rate. The
job-finding rate accounted for about 76% of the variation in unemployment. Compared
to most European countries, the US lies at the high end, with only Spain and Slovenia
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having higher contributions from the job-finding rate. Most European countries’ tend
to have a 60:40 split between contributions from the job-finding rate and contributions
from the separation rate. The median contribution from the job-finding rate for my
sample of European countries was 60.9% while the median contribution from the sepa-
ration rate was 40.6%. These numbers are quite similar for the EU-15 taken as a whole,
which were 61.3% and 37.6%, respectively. The job-finding rate is the primary driver of
unemployment fluctuations in all countries except the Czech Republic and the Nether-
lands. These results affirm those reported8 by Elsby et al. (2013) and lends even more
support to their assertion that one should seriously consider the role of the separation
rate if one seeks to understand variation in unemployment rates outside of the US.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
There has been a recent debate among macroeconomists as to the importance of the
separation rate in understanding labor market outcomes over the business cycle. Both
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2012) have argued that the separation rate is acyclical in the
US while Elsby and Solon (2009) and Fujita and Ramey (2009, 2012) have cautioned
against ignoring the cyclicaltiy of the separation rate. This paper constructed labor
market flows for a number of European countries and the US and found that most
variation in the unemployment rate is driven by the cyclicality of the job-finding rate.
However, the US is the exception rather than the rule. Most European labor markets
have a 60:40 split between the job-finding rate and the separation rate in accounting
for unemployment fluctuations at business cycle frequencies. Therefore, if one truly
wants to understand unemployment’s movements over the business cycle in Europe,
one cannot assume the separation rate in most European countries is acyclical.
Can cross-country differences in hazard rate contributions be explained by employ-
ment protection (EPL) policies? Theoretically, more stringent EPL should lower both
the number of separations and the number of new hires, resulting in an ambiguous net
effect. Stricter EPL limits job destruction by making terminations more expensive and
inhibits job creation by reducing the expected profitability of hiring a new worker as
8 They found a 55:45 job-finding/separation split for their annual time series using first differences
in the unemployment rate.
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Country std(uˆt) std(fˆt) std(sˆt) β
f βs β0 βr
Austria 8.6 17.6 9.6 51.5 45.5 -0.1 3.0
Belgium 6.7 22.6 8.8 60.2 40.6 -0.1 -0.6
Czech Republic 14.0 16.0 20.1 33.6 64.6 0.1 1.6
Denmark 16.5 16.0 9.1 68.3 30.8 0.3 0.6
Finland 7.9 8.0 7.1 52.6 47.3 0.1 0.0
France 6.1 9.7 7.3 59.8 38.7 0.1 1.4
Germany* 5.0 11.2 5.8 51.9 49.0 -0.1 -0.8
Greece 14.4 22.8 15.7 56.9 48.5 2.1 -7.4
Hungary 7.9 19.7 12.8 63.7 36.1 0.0 0.2
Ireland 18.2 24.2 18.0 49.4 48.6 1.8 0.2
Italy 7.4 21.2 8.6 71.1 33.2 1.5 -5.7
Netherlands 12.2 13.5 9.6 47.2 54.9 -1.1 -1.0
Norway 12.0 14.0 11.7 60.9 41.1 -0.1 -2.0
Poland 11.8 19.9 10.9 63.9 37.8 0.4 -2.1
Portugal 8.8 17.8 11.4 64.6 35.3 -0.4 0.5
Slovakia 10.9 52.6 23.7 73.8 50.8 0.6 -25.2
Slovenia 12.3 33.2 12.4 82.1 27.5 0.1 -9.6
Spain 13.8 15.9 6.8 79.4 24.2 0.5 -4.1
UK 7.3 8.3 5.4 68.3 31.8 -0.2 0.1
US 14.4 13.3 6.3 76.4 25.4 0.0 -1.8
EU-15* 6.7 7.6 4.9 61.3 37.6 0.8 0.3
Table 3.4: Unemployment Volatility Decomposition (%), 2005:Q1-2014:Q1. *Germany
and EU-15 start in 2006:Q1.
shown in Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002). A large volume of literature has affirmed
that stronger EPL in the form of higher firing costs generally results in an ambiguous
impact on the level of total employment, but reduces labor market flows (Bentolila and
Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992; Blanchard and Landier, 2000; Garibaldi,
1998; Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Messina and Vallanti (2007); Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994). A recent study by Perez and Yao (2015) concluded that stricter
EPL tends to reduce separation rates. Future work should examine the role labor mar-
ket institutions play in accounting for the observed differences in job-finding rates and
separation rates across countries.
Chapter 4
Dual Labor Markets and
Life-Cycle Unemployment
4.1 Introduction
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many European governments undertook labor market
reforms in an attempt to increase labor market flexibility in the face of high unem-
ployment. These reforms left employment protection legislation (EPL) on permanent
(open-ended) contracts largely unchanged while loosening regulations on or increasing
access to temporary forms of employment. This partial (two-tier) reform strategy has
given rise to dual labor markets in a number of European economies. Dual labor mar-
kets comprise a juxtaposition of workers with highly protected, long-term employment
relationships existing alongside workers with insecure, short-term forms of employment.
Temporary contracts allow firms to employ workers for a relatively short duration and
costlessly, or at dramatically reduced cost, separate from a worker once the contract has
expired. Firms could potentially forego dismissal costs indefinitely by continually renew-
ing temporary contracts with workers, although most European countries restrict the
number and/or cumulative duration of successive temporary contract renewals. Since
the unemployment rate and the incidence of temporary employment tend to decrease
with age, regulatory changes that exclusively promote the use of temporary contracts
will have disparate effects across age groups.
Such two-tiered reforms, according to Boeri and van Ours (2013), are intended to
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promote flexibility along the margin for new hires while keeping the high dismissal costs
associated with permanent contracts in place. This effectively widens the protections
granted to permanent employees relative to temporary workers. Theoretically, such
asymmetric reforms should increase both the rate of job creation and job destruction,
leading toward an ambiguous net effect on the level of unemployment. Job creation will
increase as firms hire more temporary positions exempt from dismissal costs and job
destruction will increase since firms will have less incentive to transform temporary con-
tracts into permanent ones. Saint-Paul (2000) has argued extensively that this strategy
was primarily the result of political influence exerted by incumbent employees rather
than policymakers attempting to design the most efficient form of EPL. Naturally, all
young, inexperienced workers must start as a new hire at some point before enjoying the
protections afforded incumbent employees. Therefore, labor market reforms restricted
to creating flexibility at the margin for new hires, should have a significant impact on
young workers entering the labor market. Indeed, as noted by the European Commis-
sion (2010, p. 117), dual labor markets ”can be a particularly serious problem for young
people, as a precarious start in the world of work is likely to have a long-lasting negative
impact on future employment and earnings prospects.”
The primary goal of this paper is to examine the intergenerational impact of two-tier
labor market reforms. In particular, the paper seeks to answer a number of pertinent
questions: Will the use of temporary contracts increase or decrease unemployment?
What are the welfare implications of partial labor market reforms? Will average wages
be higher or lower after partial reforms? I present a life-cycle search and matching
model in which temporary and permanent contracts coexist in order to address these
questions. The model economy is calibrated to match a set of facts from the Italian
economy prior to the implementation of the 1997 Treu reforms, the first in a set of
reforms that loosened restrictions on temporary forms of employment. The key result
is that increasing access to temporary contracts will decrease the unemployment rate
for all age groups but will have a negative impact on the average welfare of younger
workers. The model is successful at matching a number of key facts: (i) the decreasing
age-profile of unemployment, (ii) the decreasing age-profile of the incidence of temporary
employment, (iii) the earnings distribution, and (iv) the wage-gap between temporary
and permanent positions.
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While it is widely discussed in the literature that temporary positions are dispro-
portionately held by younger workers, few have tried to explicitly account for age in
their model environments. The model presented in this paper extends the life-cycle
search and matching environment developed by Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto (2014)
and Che´ron et al. (2013). Unlike the model of age-directed search presented in Menzio
et al. (2012), this class of models assumes labor markets are not segmented by age.
The key departure from the baseline framework of these models is the possibility for
firms to offer temporary and permanent positions and the assumption that human cap-
ital can only be upgraded while working in a permanent position. The model embeds
the hypothesis that temporary contracts are used as screening devices in a number of
European countries, as advocated by Faccini (2014), and assumes that matches differ
in match-specific quality that is learned over time in the style of Pries (2004) and Pries
and Rogerson (2005). Workers will only be hired, conditional on age and contract type,
if the prior probability that the match is good exceeds a certain threshold. As in Fac-
cini (2014) and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), firms can offer new hires a temporary
contract with an exogenous probability, which is a reduced form way of capturing the
strictness of labor market regulations on temporary contracts. My focus in this paper
will be on the effects of this parameter on labor market outcomes over the life-cycle.
Temporary forms of employment differ from permanent positions in three impor-
tant respects in the model environment presented in this paper. First, firing costs are
only incurred when a worker with an existing permanent contract separates from the
firm. Second, some temporary contracts must be upgraded, at which point the firm
can dismiss the worker cost-free or upgrade the contract to a permanent one. Third,
permanent contracts have the added benefit of accumulating on-the-job human capital.
Since all workers in the model are homogenous upon entering the labor market, work-
ers who are determined to be of the highest match quality early in the life-cycle will
enjoy the benefits of being in permanent positions with higher pay and with a greater
possibility to upgrade their level of human capital. Young temporary workers who are
not matched well early in the life-cycle will suffer the most because of their inability to
increase their human capital level and because firms will be more reluctant offer older
workers permanent positions. Firms are more stringent in their screening of older work-
ers for new permanent contracts due to the horizon effect. That is, the older a worker
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is, the fewer the number of periods in which the firm is able to profit from the match
and recover any expected dismissal costs associated with the permanent position.
My paper relates to two strands of literature: the extensive literature evaluating the
macroeconomic implications of temporary contracts and the literature analyzing life-
cycle unemployment. Many important studies incorporating temporary contracts into
search and matching models, including Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Alonso-Borrego
et al. (2005), Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), and Boeri (2011), assume that the market
for temporary contracts and permanent contracts are segmented. In these frameworks,
temporary employees cannot be converted into permanent positions and act as a buffer
against economic shocks. They all share the common feature that increasing labor
flexibility increases worker turnover.
The models of Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Blanchard and Landier (2002)
analyze the steady-state implications of temporary positions and allow for the conver-
sion of temporary contracts to permanent positions. Blanchard and Landier (2002)
discuss how two-tier reforms have negatively affected youth in France, but their theo-
retical model does not incorporate a life-cycle component. Both studies conclude that
increasing access to temporary contracts would have the perverse effect of increasing
the unemployment rate in addition to lowering the welfare of workers. The intuition
that informs this result is that, when firing costs are large, allowing the creation of more
temporary jobs will increase both job creation and job destruction simultaneously. The
latter effect will dominate since firms will choose not to transform temporary jobs into
permanent positions when dismissal costs are prohibitive.
In the model of Faccini (2014), which bears the most similarity to my model along the
temporary contracting dimension, if temporary positions are used as a screening mech-
anism, we should observe a permanent decrease in the unemployment rate and large
welfare gains after the enactment of policies permitting more temporary jobs. This is
in stark contrast to the majority of the literature that has raised serious concerns on
the efficacy of using temporary contracts as a tool to combat high unemployment. Fac-
cini (2014) supports his claims empirically and demonstrates that looser regulations on
temporary contracts are associated with a reduction in unemployment rates in Europe.
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My paper also contributes to the existing life-cycle equilibrium unemployment lit-
erature. In particular, it extends the recent work of Che´ron et al. (2013) and Esteban-
Pretel and Fujimoto (2014) to allow for temporary and permanent positions. The latter
study employs a search and matching model of the labor market that incorporates a
life-cycle structure with human capital accumulation to account for the fact that, in the
United States, the unemployment, job finding, and separation rates are all decreasing
with age. Another study that attempts to account for these three key phenomena with
one-sided search over the life-cycle is Gorry (2011). These findings are not unique to
the United States and, as is shown in the European Commission’s report (2010), are
characteristic of almost all European countries. While accounting for this set of facts
is not the primary purpose of my study, I am able to replicate all these features in
my own model with the exception of the decreasing separation rate. Hahn (2009) uses
a continuous time, overlapping generations, matching model and concludes that labor
market institutions have a differential impact for different age groups when a worker is
only active in the labor market up to a certain age. Young workers and older workers
will be particularly sensitive to policy measures. Though Hahn (2009) discusses the
implications and interactions of labor market policies over the life-cycle, he does not
allow for the existence of dual labor markets in his model environment.
4.2 Two-Tier Reforms: The Italian Experience
Most of the literature analyzing the macroeconomic effects of temporary employment
have focused on the cases of France and Spain. However, the case of Italy in the late
1990s serves as a particularly good laboratory to evaluate the impact of liberalizing the
use of temporary contracts. As pointed out by Boeri (2011) and the European Com-
mission (2010), Italy seems to be the country characterized by the most asymmetric set
of reforms, liberalizing temporary forms of employment drastically while keeping EPL
on permanent contracts untouched. Figure 4.1 shows the OECD’s EPL Indicator on
temporary forms of employment for both the 1990s and 2000s. The index measures the
regulation of temporary contracts and ranges from 0-6, with higher values representing
stricter regulations. Any observation below the 45 degree line indicates that regulations
on temporary forms of employment were liberalized between the 1990s and 2000s. In
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terms of differences, Italy had the largest drop in the EPL indicator on temporary em-
ployment. I discuss some of the laws governing permanent contracts in Italy and the set
of major labor market reforms that were passed in 1997, 2001, and 2003 below.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the EPL temporary employment indicator. Source: OECD
Italy has some of the strictest regulations in Europe pertaining to the dismissal of
permanent employees. In Italy, workers on permanent contracts enjoy the protections
granted to them under Article 18 of the Italian Workers’ Statute (Act No. 300 of 1970).
Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute, a piece of legislation passed in 1970 that establishes
a set of workers’ rights, protects employees from ‘unfair’ dismissals by firms that employ
15 or more workers. If a judge rules that a worker was dismissed unfairly by an employer,
the employee has the right to be fully reinstated by the firm or be given 15 months of
pay plus any foregone wages from the time of the initial dismissal up to the point of the
court ruling. Workers opt for the severance payments in over 95 percent of the cases
ruled in the worker’s favor (Garibaldi and Taddei, 2013). The reforms of 2012 (the so
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called Fornero reforms) shifted this choice of a severance payment or reinstatement to
the court. Garibaldi and Violante (2005) study the firing costs in Italy in great detail
and conclude that the majority of the dismissal costs are transfers to the worker rather
than a tax paid to a third-party. They estimate the ex ante firing cost in Italy to be
18.75 months of average wages, of which only 3.5 months are the tax component. The
model presented in this paper only focuses on the tax component of the firing costs.
Temporary forms of employment were substantially liberalized in 1997 through the
Treu reforms (Act No. 196 of 1997). The Treu reforms allowed, for the first time, the
establishment of temporary help agencies and reduced the penalties associated with
using fixed-term contracts illegally. It also eased regulation of new apprenticeships and
work-training contracts and ended the automatic conversion of fixed-term contracts into
permanent employment (Tealdi, 2011).
In 2001, another reform was undertaken (Legislative Decree No. 368 of 2001) that
widened the categories of jobs in which fixed-term contracts could be used, based on
a 1999 EU Directive. Prior to the reform, fixed-term employment could only be used
in limited situations. The reform significantly expanded the conditions under which a
fixed-term contract could be used and only required that the motivation for the limited
duration of employment be written into the contract. There is no maximum duration
on a single fixed-term contract, but fixed-term contracts longer than three years cannot
be renewed upon expiration.
The last major reform on the use of temporary employment was the Biagi reforms
of 2003 (Act No. 30 of 2003). The Biagi reforms allowed more flexibility for jobs on
call, staff leasing, and new probationary contracts. The effect each reform had on the
OECD’s synthetic indicator is shown in Figure 4.2, as well as the unemployment rate
for those aged 15-64. A similar graph is also shown and discussed in Faccini (2014)
which led him to report the stylized fact that, in Italy, the liberalization of temporary
contracts closely coincided with a reduction in the unemployment rate.
Throughout my analysis, I define youth to be the 20-29 age group. The OECD
(2008) reports that the age at which 50 percent of the young people in Italy have finished
their initial education is 19.9 and the median age in Italy when full-time education was
stopped as 19.5. Similarly, Eurostat reports that the average age for individuals leaving
formal education in Italy is 21. Therefore, I believe it is reasonable to take age 20 to
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Figure 4.2: Unemployment rate and EPL temporary employment indicator. Source:
OECD
roughly be the age of entry for young workers in Italy. For the sake of this analysis,
it is therefore more appropriate to adopt 20 as the approximate age of entry for young
workers in Italy. I define prime to be those aged 30-54 and overall to be those aged
15-64.
From the period prior to the reforms to the period after the Biagi reforms, the
unemployment rate in Italy dropped from an average of 11.3% between 1993 and 1997
to 7.2% between 2004 and 2007. For those aged 20-29, the age group that I have
labeled youth, the unemployment rate dropped from an elevated 22.2% to 14.7%. For
those aged 30-54, the unemployment rate dropped from 6.5% to 5.2%. Over these same
time periods, the incidence of temporary employment increased from 5.1% to 9.5%. I
take the incidence of temporary employment to be temporary employment as a share
of total employment, rather than the typically used dependent employees. This rate
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surged from 9.7% to 22% for youth and rose from 3.5% to 6.9% for prime aged workers.
The summary statistics before and after the Italian reforms are shown in Table 4.1.
Although it would be extremely reductive to attribute the drop in the unemployment
rate to the labor market reforms alone, Faccini (2014) has demonstrated empirically
that looser regulations on temporary contracts are associated with reductions in the
unemployment rate in Europe. Therefore, I hypothesize that the labor market reforms
were at least partially responsible for the drop in the unemployment rate in Italy.
Unemployment Rate (percent)
Overall Youth Prime
Pre-reform (1993-1997) 11.3 22.2 6.5
Post-reform (2004-2008) 7.2 14.7 5.2
Percentage point difference -4.1 -7.5 -1.3
Incidence of Temp. Employment (percent)
Overall Youth Prime
Pre-reform (1993-1997) 5.1 9.7 3.5
Post-reform (2004-2008) 9.5 22.0 6.9
Percentage point difference 4.4 12.3 3.4
Table 4.1: Italy pre and post-reform. Source: Eurostat, OECD.
4.3 Model
The model is a version of Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto’s (2014) overlapping generations
search model extended to include both temporary and permanent contracts in a similar
manner as Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Faccini (2014).
4.3.1 Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. Two types of agents participate in the economy,
workers and firms. There are N overlapping generations of workers and a continuum of
firms with positive measure. Workers are either employed and producing or unemployed
and searching for jobs. There is no on-the-job search. At each point in time, a continuum
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of new workers (normalized to unity) enter the labor market as unemployed and are
active for N periods, where N ≥ 2 is an integer. Firms have one job, are ex ante
homogenous, and post vacancies in order to be matched with an unemployed worker.
A unit of production in the economy is a matched firm-worker pair. Both workers and
firms are risk-neutral and discount the future by the factor β ∈ (0, 1). There is no
aggregate uncertainty in the economy.
Workers differ in age and in their level of general human capital. All workers start
at the lowest skill level, z1 > 0, and have the potential to accumulate it up to zH , where
z1 ≤ . . . ≤ zH and H ≥ 1 is an integer. It is assumed that workers can only accumulate
human capital while working under a permanent contract and will upgrade to the next
level with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] each period. This can be thought of as educational
benefits or on-the-job training and captures the notion that firms are more likely to train
workers with whom they expect to maintain long employment relations. Empirically,
the OECD (2002) and European Commission (2010) have found that temporary workers
receive considerably less formal employer-provided training and less on-the-job training
than permanent workers, which serves as motivation for this assumption. A worker’s
level of human capital does not decay and stays with the worker until she exits the labor
market.
Matching Technology
Labor markets are frictional in the sense that unemployed workers and vacant jobs are
paired through an imperfect matching process each period. Unemployed workers are
heterogenous along two dimensions, in their age and along their level of human capital.
It is assumed that firms cannot direct their search. Therefore, workers of all ages and
skill compete for the same vacancy postings. That is, the labor market is not segmented
by age or human capital. Despite not being able to ex ante discriminate, once the firm
meets a worker, the worker’s age and level of human capital are revealed and the firm
can choose not to engage in production with the worker. Let ua,h be the number of
unemployed workers of age a ∈ {1, . . . , N} with human capital level h ∈ {1, . . . ,H} and
v be the number vacancies. The total number of unemployed workers in the economy
is:
∑N
a=1
∑H
h=1 ua,h. However, due to the timing assumption that it takes one period
for a match to become productive, the oldest generation of unemployed workers will not
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actively search for a vacancy (those aged N). Therefore, the measure of job-seekers is
u =
∑N−1
a=1
∑H
h=1 ua,h. The number of new matches each period is given by M(v, u).
The matching function M is increasing and concave in both arguments and exhibits
constant returns-to-scale. The latter assumption allows the per-period probability of a
vacant job (unemployed worker) being matched with an unemployed worker (a vacant
job) to be expressed as a function of market tightness, θ = v/u. The probability that
a vacant job meets an unemployed worker is M(u, v)/v = q(θ) and the probability
that an unemployed worker meets an unemployed worker is M(u, v)/u = θq(θ) = p(θ).
It is important to note that not all matches will necessarily result in an employment
relationship.
Production Technology and Learning
There are two types of match-specific qualities: good (y¯ = yg) and bad (y¯ = yb ≤
yg). Match quality is persistent and lasts for the entire duration of an employment
relationship. Output at time t is observed at the end of a period and is given by
yt = zhy¯ + εt where y¯ is the true match-specific productivity component, zh is the
worker-specific level of human capital, and εt is a mean-zero idiosyncratic productivity
shock which is i.i.d. across time and matches. The ‘noise’ term, εt, is assumed to be
uniformly distributed over the interval [−ε¯, ε¯] where ε¯ ≥ 0. Under these assumptions,
the learning process takes an all-or-nothing form, as in Pries and Rogeron (2005).
Figure 4.3: Potential Output and Match-Specific Types
When a worker and firm are initially matched with one another, the worker and firm
know the worker’s age, a, and human capital, zh, but the true match-specific quality, y¯,
is unknown to both. The worker and firm observe the prior pi ∈ [0, 1] which corresponds
to the probability that the match is of good quality. It is assumed that pi is drawn
from the distribution F (pi) when a worker and firm first meet. The firm and worker
will learn that the true quality of the match is good whenever yt ∈ [zhyb + ε¯, zhyg + ε¯]
and will learn that the quality of the match is bad whenever yt ∈ [zhyb − ε¯, zhyg − ε¯].
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If the observed output lies in the range [zhyg − ε¯, zhyb + ε¯], nothing is learned and the
posterior probability will equal the prior, pi. Therefore, given the assumptions about the
noisy component of output, εt, the probability the true quality of the match is revealed
at the end of the period is αh = (yg − yb)zh/2ε¯ and the probability that nothing is
learned about match quality is simply its complement, (1 − αh). The probability that
the match is revealed, αh, is independent of the worker’s age and of the match’s actual
quality but is strictly increasing in the worker’s human capital, zh. In order to ensure
that αh ≤ 1, it is assumed that (yg − yb)zH ≤ 2ε¯. Since both good and bad matches
have the same probability of being revealed, the proportion of good quality matches
that have not been revealed remains pi. It follows that the the probability that a match
is revealed to be of the good type is αhpi and the probability that the match is revealed
to be of the bad type is αh(1− pi).
Separations between a firm and a worker occur for three different reasons. First, a
firm and a worker may choose to endogenously separate if the joint surplus is too low
to justify the continuation of the employment relationship. Second, matches are exoge-
nously destroyed with probability λ ∈ [0, 1]. Third, matches are destroyed whenever the
worker exits the labor force at age (N + 1).
Temporary and Permanent Contracts
Two types of labor contracts co-exist in the economy: temporary and permanent. Tem-
porary contracts differ from permanent contracts along three dimensions. First, tempo-
rary contracts can be dismissed costlessly. Second, temporary contracts can be upgraded
to permanent contracts whenever the non-renewal clause is activated, but permanent
contracts cannot be downgraded to temporary ones. Third, permanent contracts have
the added benefit of potentially increasing the worker’s human capital stock.
Whenever an existing permanent contract is terminated, for endogenous or exoge-
nous reasons, the firm incurs the dismissal cost d ≥ 0. Only continuing matches are
subject to these dismissal costs. That is, upon first meeting, the firm and worker can
choose to dissolve the match without having to pay any dismissal costs. This cost is
a pure resource waste. Dismissal costs are an an exogenous ‘tax’ and should not be
viewed as transfers to workers, such as severance pay, but as transfers from the firm to
a third-party outside of the match. As noted in Pries and Rogerson (2005), referring
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to these as dismissal costs is somewhat of a misnomer, since it is effectively a separa-
tion tax levied on employers. Temporary contracts cannot be renewed with probability
η ∈ [0, 1]. If the non-renewal clause is activated, the firm and worker have the option
to convert the contract into a permanent one or to dissolve the match altogether.
When matched with a firm and employed under a permanent contract, the worker
will upgrade her human capital stock with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1]. In this sense, a
permanent contract is a different technology than that of a temporary contract. The
upgrade does not cost the worker or firm any resources in this framework and is simply
an added benefit of a permanent contract. Following the modeling framework of Cahuc
and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Faccini (2014), when a firm and worker first meet, the
firm can initially offer the worker a temporary contract with probability φ ∈ [0, 1]. This
is a policy instrument that captures the ease with which a firm can offer temporary
contracts in the economy.
The timing of the model is as follows. Separations occur at the beginning of each
period, allowing workers (unless exiting) and firms to begin searching and posting again
within the period. Wages are then negotiated and new matches formed. Matches that
are formed in period t become productive in period t+ 1. Matches of unknown quality
in period t will observe output at the end of the period and update their beliefs at the
beginning of period t + 1. Human capital accumulation is realized at the very end of
each period following production.
4.3.2 The Problem of the Agents
I now characterize the steady-state behavior of firms and workers in the economy. I
adopt the following notation:
• Ji,a,h: Value to the firm with a worked aged a, human capital level h, and contract
type i;
• Wi,a,h: Value to the worker aged a with human capital level h and contract type
i;
• Ua,h: Value of being unemployed when aged a and with human capital level h;
• V : Value to the firm of a vacant job slot.
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where i ∈ {T, P0, P}. T denotes a temporary contract, P0 a new permanent contract,
and P a continuing permanent contract. There needs to be a distinction between a new
permanent contract and one that has been active for at least one period because new
permanent contracts are exempt from the firing costs d.
Firms
Firms are free to open a vacancy and search for unemployed workers. The resource cost
of posting a vacancy is each period is κ > 0. Letting V be the expected value of a
vacancy, the value of posting a vacancy can be written as:
V = −κ+ β(1− q(θ))V
+ βq(θ)
N−1∑
a=1
H∑
h=1
ua,h
u
[
φ
∫ 1
0
JT,a+1,h(pi)dF (pi) + (1− φ)
∫ 1
0
JP0,a+1,h(pi)dF (pi)
]
(4.1)
The value of posting a vacancy has the following interpretation: A firm pays κ to post
a vacancy and, with probability (1 − q(θ)), the firm does not meet a worker and the
firm enters the next period with a vacant job. With probability q(θ), the firm meets a
worker. Since the search process is undirected, the firm is randomly allocated a worker
of age a with skill level zh. The probability of meeting such a worker is simply ua,h/u.
With probability φ, the firm can initially offer a temporary contract. Matches produce
at the end of the following period, so firms must make an expectation about being in
a good quality match. The prior probability of it being of the good type is pi and is
drawn from the distribution F (pi).
After being matched, the firm decides at the beginning of the next period whether to
hire the worker and produce this period or to dissolve the match. Once a firm employs
a worker, wages are negotiated and production takes place. The value to the firm of a
temporary contract being matched with a worker type (a, h) with the prior pi that the
match is good at the beginning of a period is:
JT,a,h(pi) = max{JcT,a,h(pi), V }
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The continuation value is given by:
JcT,a,h(pi) = pizhyg + (1− pi)zhyb − wT,a,h(pi) + βλV
+ β(1− λ)αhpi
[
ηJP0,a+1,h(1) + (1− η)JT,a+1,h(1)
]
+ β(1− λ)αh(1− pi)
[
ηJP0,a+1,h(0) + (1− η)JT,a+1,h(0)
]
+ β(1− λ)(1− αh)
[
ηJP0,a+1,h(pi) + (1− η)JT,a+1,h(pi)
]
where wT,a,h(pi) is the wage paid to the worker. The first three terms on the right-hand
side are expected current-period profits. The expected output is independent of the
noise term because ε is assumed to have mean zero. The fourth term is the expected
value of the match being destroyed exogenously and having a vacant job the following
period. Conditional on the match surviving in the following period, the firm’s expected
value will depend on whether the match quality is revealed and if the non-renewal
clause is activated. With probability ρ, the non-renewal clause is activated and the
firm is forced to either upgrade the contract to a permanent one or dismiss the worker.
Match-specific quality is revealed to be good with probability αhpi, revealed to be bad
with probability αh(1−pi), and with probability (1−αh) nothing is learned about match
quality.
The value to the firm of a new permanent contract with a worker type (a, h) with
the prior pi that the match is good at the beginning of a period is:
JP0,a,h(pi) = max{JcP0,a,h(pi), V }
where the continuation value is given by:
JcP0,a,h(pi) = pizhyg + (1− pi)zhyb − wP0,a,h(pi) + βλ(V − d)
+ β(1− λ)αhpi
[
ρJP,a+1,h′(1) + (1− ρ)JP,a+1,h(1)
]
+ β(1− λ)αh(1− pi)
[
ρJP,a+1,h′(0) + (1− ρ)JP,a+1,h(0)
]
+ β(1− λ)(1− αh)
[
ρJP,a+1,h′(pi) + (1− ρ)JP,a+1,h(pi)
]
where h′ ≡ min{h+ 1, H} indexes the accumulation of human capital to the next level.
Recall that a permanent contract cannot be downgraded to a temporary one, so a
permanent contract will remain permanent until it is dissolved. The revelation about
match quality has the same interpretation as it did with the temporary contracts.
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Finally, the value to the firm of a continuing permanent contract is:
JP,a,h(pi) = max{JcP,a,h(pi), V − d}
where the continuation value is given by:
JcP,a,h(pi) = pizhyg + (1− pi)zhyb − wP,a,h(pi) + βλ(V − d)
+ β(1− λ)αhpi
[
ρJP,a+1,h′(1) + (1− ρ)JP,a+1,h(1)
]
+ β(1− λ)αh(1− pi)
[
ρJP,a+1,h′(0) + (1− ρ)JP,a+1,h(0)
]
+ β(1− λ)(1− αh)
[
ρJP,a+1,h′(pi) + (1− ρ)JP,a+1,h(pi)
]
The only difference between a new and a continuing permanent contract is the wage and
the inability to avoid the firing cost after being together after one period. The value to
the firm with an exiting worker is:
JT,N+1,h(pi) = JP0,N+1,h(pi) = V
JP,N+1,h(pi) = V − d
for all pi ∈ [0, 1] and h ∈ {1, . . . ,H}.
Workers
As is standard in search and matching models, wages are assumed to be the result of
generalized Nash bargaining with workers having the bargaining parameter µ ∈ [0, 1].
However, I make the additional assumption that there is a minimum wage w¯ present
in the economy. As in Pries and Rogerson (2005) and Faccini (2014), the wage is the
result of generalized Nash bargaining whenever the minimum wage is non-binding and
require that the worker receives at least the fraction µ of the match surplus. Thus, the
worker receives exactly the fraction µ of the match surplus whenever the minimum wage
is non-binding and possibly more whenever it is binding. When the wage is the result of
generalized Nash bargaining, firms and workers never disagree about match formation
and split the surplus whenever the match surplus is positive. However, in the presence
of a minimum wage, this is no longer the case. It is now possible for the worker to prefer
to be hired at the minimum wage w¯ but the firm may not if the surplus generated by the
match is sufficiently low. To put it another way, the surplus of a pair may be positive,
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but if the worker is being allocated more than the entire match surplus, the firm would
be better off not hiring the worker at all. Since the hiring decision requires the consent
of both the worker and the firm, it is sufficient to only consider the firm’s decision.
Therefore, in what follows, the workers simply take the firms’ hiring decisions as given.
Unemployed workers search for jobs each period. The value of being unemployed
for a worker aged a with skill level zh, Ua,h, is
Ua,h = b+ β
(
1− p(θ))Ua+1,h
+ βp(θ)
[
φ
∫ 1
0
WT,a+1,h(pi)dF (pi) + (1− φ)
∫ 1
0
WP0,a+1,h(pi)dF (pi)
]
(4.2)
where b is the per-period value of being unemployed which can be viewed as the combi-
nation of unemployment benefits and the value of leisure. This flow value is independent
of age or human capital.
A worker aged a with human capital level zh being offered a temporary contract has
the lifetime utility value of
WT,a,h(pi) = XT,a,h(pi)W
c
T,a,h(pi) + (1−XT,a,h(pi))Ua,h
where XT,a,h(pi) is the firm’s hiring rule, which is defined as
XT,a,h(pi) =
{
1, if JcT,a,h(pi) ≥ V
0, otherwise
The firm’s hiring rules are the only real economic decisions being made in this model
economy. Workers simply take these as given and only play a role during the bargaining
process. The continuation value is given by:
W cT,a,h(pi) = wT,a,h(pi) + βλUa+1,h
+ β(1− λ)αhpi
[
ηWP0,a+1,h(1) + (1− η)WT,a+1,h(1)
]
+ β(1− λ)αh(1− pi)
[
ηWP0,a+1,h(0) + (1− η)WT,a+1,h(0)
]
+ β(1− λ)(1− αh)
[
ηWP0,a+1,h(pi) + (1− η)WT,a+1,h(pi)
]
where wT,a,h(pi), as in the firm’s problem, is the wage paid to the worker.
The value to the worker of a new permanent contract with age a and human capital
level zh and with the prior pi that the match is of the good type at the beginning of a
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period is:
WP0,a,h(pi) = XP0,a,hW
c
P0,a,h(pi) + (1−XP0,a,h)Ua,h
where XP0,a,h(pi) is the firm’s hiring rule, which is defined as
XP0,a,h(pi) =
{
1, if JcP0,a,h(pi) ≥ V
0, otherwise
and the continuation value is given by:
W cP0,a,h(pi) = wP0,a,h(pi) + βλ
[
ρUa+1,h′ + (1− ρ)Ua+1,h
]
+ β(1− λ)αhpi
[
ρWP,a+1,h′(1) + (1− ρ)WP,a+1,h(1)
]
+ β(1− λ)αh(1− pi)
[
ρWP,a+1,h′(0) + (1− ρ)WP,a+1,h(0)
]
+ β(1− λ)(1− αh)
[
ρWP,a+1,h′(pi) + (1− ρ)WP,a+1,h(pi)
]
where h′ ≡ min{h+ 1, H} indexes the accumulation of human capital to the next level.
It is important to take note that even if the worker is terminated for exogenous reasons
next period, she still receives the human capital appreciation with probability ρ within
the period.
Finally, the lifetime value to a worker with a continuing permanent contract is:
WP,a,h(pi) = XP,a,hW
c
P,a,h(pi) + (1−XP,a,h)Ua,h
where XP0,a,h(pi) is the firm’s hiring rule, which is defined as
XP,a,h(pi) =
{
1, if JcP,a,h(pi) ≥ V − d
0, otherwise
and the continuation value is given by:
W cP,a,h(pi) = wP,a,h(pi) + βλ
[
ρUa+1,h′ + (1− ρ)Ua+1,h
]
+ β(1− λ)αhpi
[
ρWP,a+1,h′(1) + (1− ρ)WP,a+1,h(1)
]
+ β(1− λ)αh(1− pi)
[
ρWP,a+1,h′(0) + (1− ρ)WP,a+1,h(0)
]
+ β(1− λ)(1− αh)
[
ρWP,a+1,h′(pi) + (1− ρ)WP,a+1,h(pi)
]
61
The only difference between a new and a continuing permanent contract, from the
worker’s perspective, is the potentially differing current period wages. The terminal
conditions for the workers at the end of the life-cycle are:
UN+1,h = WT,N+1,h(pi) = WP0,N+1,h(pi) = WP,N+1,h(pi) = 0
for all pi ∈ [0, 1] and h ∈ {1, . . . ,H}.
4.3.3 Surplus and Wage Bargaining
As previously discussed, wages are set via Nash bargaining whenever the minimum wage
doesn’t bind. The surplus of a match is defined as:
ST,a,h(pi) = JT,a,h(pi) +WT,a,h(pi)− Ua,h − V
SP0,a,h(pi) = JP0,a,h(pi) +WP0,a,h(pi)− Ua,h − V
SP,a,h(pi) = JP,a,h(pi) +WP,a,h(pi)− Ua,h − (V − d)
Since the firm makes the hiring decision unilaterally and the worker simply takes the
firm’s decision as given, the surplus of each match is Si,a,h(pi) = Xi,a,h(pi)S
c
i,a,h(pi) ≥ 0
for a contract type i. Again, it is sufficient only to consider the firm’s problem since the
worker would always receive at least a fraction µ of the surplus and would be willing
to work whenever the surplus has positive value. It can be shown by starting from the
terminal conditions and iterating backwards that the surplus is increasing in the prior
pi since pi has no influence on either the firm or worker’s outside option. However, the
surplus will, in general, not be continuous in pi. Thus, the firm’s hiring decisions will
display the usual cutoff rules for a given contract type, age, and human capital stock.
Firms will hire any worker with a prior pi above the cutoff rule. The value the worker
receives from a match of contract type i is:
Wi,a,h(pi)− Ua,h ≥ µSi,a,h(pi)
which holds with equality any time the minimum wage is non-binding. The wage func-
tion is wi,a,h(pi) = max{w¯, wni,a,h(pi)}, where the second element in the max operator is
the wage determined by generalized Nash bargaining. We can now define a steady-state
equilibrium in this environment.
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4.3.4 Equilibrium
Given the initial stocks of employed and unemployed and the terminal conditions of
the value functions, a steady-state equilibrium in this economy is a set {Wi,a,h(pi),Ua,h,
Ji,a,h(pi),V ,Xi,a,h(pi),wi,a,h(pi), ei,a,h(pi),ua,h,θ} for all i ∈ {T, P0, P}, a ∈ {1, . . . , N},
h ∈ {1, . . . ,H}, and pi ∈ [0, 1], such that the following conditions hold:
1. Given wi,a,h and θ, the value functions satisfy the agents’ problems above;
2. Given wi,a,h and θ, Xi,a,h(pi) is the firm’s optimal decision rule;
3. wi,a,h = max
{
w¯, wni,a,h
}
, where wni,a,h is the result of Nash bargaining;
4. The free entry condition is satisfied, V = 0;
5. The probabilities of finding a worker/firm are consistent with the matching func-
tion;
6. The flows ei,a,h(pi) and ua,h are consistent with the firm’s hiring rules.
Since each entering cohort is normalized to unity, the measure of the employed and
unemployed in each age group a is:
1 =
H∑
h=1
(
ua,h +
∑
i∈{T,P0,P}
∫ 1
0
ei,a,h(pi)dpi
)
As noted in Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto (2014), in life-cycle search models with a single
labor market, one cannot generally prove that there is a unique equilibrium because the
value of meeting a worker in the free-entry condition may not be monotonic in market-
tightness, θ. However, Hahn (2009) has argued that multiple equilibria is unlikely for
a sufficiently high bargaining power. I choose a high value for µ in the calibration
below and verify numerically that the equilibrium is unique by checking the free-entry
condition around reasonable ranges for θ.
4.4 Calibration
I calibrate the model economy to match a number of key facts about the Italian economy
prior to the first major set of reforms to temporary contracts (Treu reforms) in 1997. I
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then explore what the effects of increasing access to temporary contracts via the policy
parameter φ in Section 4.5.
A model period is taken to be a quarter. I assume that individuals enter the labor
market one period before they turn 20 years old. This way, all workers who are initially
matched after entry will be at least 20 years of age. Workers are active in the labor
market until they turn 65, at which point, they exit the labor market exogenously.
Therefore, the number of quarters (including those aged 19.75) a worker is active is
N = 181. I assume an annual interest rate of 4%, which implies a quarterly discount
factor of β = 0.99. To keep the model as parsimonious as possible, I assume that there
are only two experience/human capital levels, H = 2.
I anchor all the production technologies around a match of the lowest quality with
a worker having the initial level of human capital. That is, the bad match quality and
the initial level of experience are each normalized to unity, yb = z1 = 1. I also make
the assumption that a good quality match is twice as productive as a bad one, yg = 2.
The probability a match is revealed when the worker has experience level z1 is then
α1 = (yg − yb)z1/2ε¯ = 1/2ε¯. Assuming that the worst match combination is revealed,
on average, after observing output for a year, we have α1 = 0.25 which implies that
ε¯ = 2.
The firing costs d are taken to be a year’s worth of expected output of the worst
match combination (those with yb and z1), giving d = 4. It will be shown later that
this level of d is consistent with the values estimated by Garibaldi and Violante (2005).
While most studies are able to pin the unemployment benefits and leisure values to
the elasticity of unemployment with respect to b theoretically, in this model we cannot
determine what the average wage will be prior to simulating the model. However, to en-
sure that the worst combination matches which are revealed are destroyed in equilibrium
on both temporary contracts and new permanent contracts, it is sufficient to assume
that b > z1yb = 1. I take a conservative value of the unemployment benefits/value of
leisure to be b = 1.05. As will be shown later, after the model is calibrated, this implies
a replacement ratio to the average wage of 0.36. Since Italy is characterized by one
of the lowest net unemployment benefit ratios in the OECD, averaging 0.23 between
2001-2011, this value is not drastically different from what one might expect to observe.
There is no national minimum wage in Italy. However, there are minimum wages
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which are set in sectoral collective agreements within the economy that broadly apply
to many outside the agreements themselves. Dolado et al. (1996) reports a ratio of
0.71 in 1991 for the minimum wage resulting from these collective agreements compared
to the national average wage. Again, while I cannot pin down the average wage before
simulating the model, I assume the minimum wage is close to the value of unemployment
benefits and leisure and set w¯ = 1.15. After calibration, this implies a ratio of 0.39, far
below the 0.71 reported by Dolado et al. (1996). Despite this number being off for the
mean wage, compared to the median wage in the simulations, this ratio rises to 0.59.
While the model comes up short along this dimension in relation to the average wage,
a higher minimum wage will only serve to reinforce my main result.
I assume the matching function is Cobb-Douglas and takes the functional form:
M(u, v) = Auδv(1−δ). I calibrate A to match the job-finding rate reported by Elsby et al.
(2013), as is noted below, and take the worker’s bargaining power to be the same as the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment, µ = δ = 0.8, which
seems relatively high compared to the findings reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001). However, since not all matches will result in hires in this model, this is not
inconsistent with their findings and the 0.8 assumed will in fact be an upper bound of
the elasticity of hires with respect to unemployment.
The remaining eight parameters are determined endogenously from a set of targets
taken from Italian data over the period 1993-1997. The coefficient of the matching
function, A, and the exogenous destruction rate, λ, are calibrated to match the average
quarterly job-finding rate and separation rate for Italy as reported by Elsby et al.
(2013) over 1993-1997. The probability of initially being offered a temporary contract
after being matched, φ, and the probability a temporary contract is not renewed, η, are
calibrated to match the five year average incidence of temporary employment for the
youth and for prime aged workers over the period 1993-1997. The highest experience
level, z2, and the probability of gaining experience while employed on a permanent
contract, ρ, are calibrated to match the average net earnings ratios for both the 90-10
and the 50-10 deciles for Italy for 1993 and 1995. Similar to Pries and Rogerson (2005)
and Faccini (2014), the distribution of priors, F (pi), is obtained from a normal with
mean zero and standard deviation σ which is then truncated to the support [0, 1] and
rescaled to integrate to one. The parameter σ is calibrated to match the average youth
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unemployment rate and the prime unemployment rate over the period 1993-1997. I also
attempt to match the raw wage gap between temporary and permanent workers in Italy
in 1997 of 0.72 as reported by the OECD (2002). Normalizing θ = 1 for the benchmark
case allows us to pin down the vacancy posting cost κ from the free-entry condition once
all the value functions are determined. To summarize, the targets and their resulting
model outcomes are shown in Table 4.2.
Targets Source Data Model
Youth unemployment rate Eurostat 0.222 0.260
Prime unemployment rate Eurostat 0.065 0.070
Youth incidence of temporary contracts Eurostat 0.097 0.103
Prime incidence of temporary contracts Eurostat 0.035 0.035
Job-finding rate Elsby et al. (2013) 0.109 0.133
Separation rate Elsby et al. (2013) 0.014 0.012
Wage gap OECD 0.720 0.759
90-10 net earnings ratio OECD 2.370 2.483
50-10 net earnings ratio OECD 1.518 1.024
Table 4.2: Targets and Model Outcomes
It should be noted that it is difficult to generate the earnings ratio for both the
90-10 and the 50-10 simultaneously when there are only two human capital states,
especially when the state is an absorbing one. The 90-10 ratio tempers the human
capital accumulation. If people jump to the most experienced state too quickly in the
life-cycle, there is virtually no earnings spread in the distribution of wages. Thus, I
can have a much higher accumulation of human capital, but it will substantially miss
the 90-10 earnings target. It is also difficult to match the youth unemployment rate
while also matching the overall job-finding rate. Since everyone (at age 19.75) starts as
unemployed, matching the youth rate of 22.2% observed in the data requires people to
find jobs too quickly, so there is a trade-off when attempting to match both the youth
unemployment rate and the overall job-finding rate. Despite these tensions, the baseline
targets are matched reasonably well with the exception of the 50-10 ratio. The resulting
baseline parameters are shown in Table 4.3.
Returning to the assumption regarding the dismissal cost, d, Garibaldi and Violante
(2005) estimate an ex ante firing tax of 3.5 months of average wages for Italy. The
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Exogenous Parameters
Discount Factor β 0.99
Productivity of low-skilled worker z1 1
Productivity of bad-quality match yb 1
Productivity of good-quality match yg 2
Uniform noise range ε¯ 2
Worker’s bargaining power µ 0.8
Elasticity of matching function w.r.t. unemployment δ 0.8
Value of leisure/Unemployment benefits b 1.05
Minimum wage w¯ 1.15
Dismissal cost d 4
Endogenous Parameters
Scale of matching function A 0.431
Productivity of high-skilled worker z2 2.408
Standard deviation of the truncated normal σ 1.546
Exogenous separation rate λ 0.008
Probability of human capital accumulation ρ 0.007
Probability of non-renewal η 0.056
Probability of being offered a temporary contract φ 0.138
Vacancy posting cost κ 0.155
Table 4.3: Calibrated Parameter Values
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dismissal costs relative to the model generated average wage is 1.37, which implies that
the firing cost in the model is 4.1 months worth of the average wage, which is in line
with their estimate, lending support for my assumption on the level of the dismissal
cost.
4.5 Results
I now present the results of the calibration exercise and later show the implications of
increasing access to temporary contracts through the policy parameter φ. Figure 4.4
shows the firm’s hiring rules for the baseline results. The worker’s age is on the x-axis
and the prior probability, pi, that the match is of the good type is on the y-axis. The
firm will hire any worker with a prior above the lines shown for a particular age and
contract type. That is Xi,a,h = 1, for all pi’s above the lines shown for a given contract
type with a worker aged a and with human capital h. The high-skilled cutoffs are shown
in the right panel.
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Figure 4.4: Firm’s Cutoff Rules
The firm is most selective whenever it offers a new permanent contract (P0) to a
low-skilled worker. This is rather intuitive. Since the firm knows that it will incur the
dismissal cost d at some point if it hires a worker on a permanent contract, it prefers to
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be fairly certain that the match is good. However, if the worker is high-skilled, the firm
is much less selective and is more willing to play the odds because of the large benefits
of being in a good match with the highest skilled worker. The cutoff rules for existing
permanent contracts (P ) merely indicate that firms will separate with workers that are
revealed to be the bad type since the cutoff rules for the existing permanent contracts
are always less than the cutoff rules for new permanent contracts. That is, since the
prior pi never changes as long as the match exists and is not revealed, if a pi makes
it through the filter of a new permanent contract, the match will continue unless it is
destroyed for exogenous reasons or if the match is revealed to be bad. In this sense, the
only interesting decision rules to consider are those for new permanent and temporary
contracts.
With a temporary contract (T ), a firm is less selective in its hiring practices because
it can costlessly separate from the worker if the match turns out to be the bad type.
This represents the screening motive for temporary positions. All matches that are not
revealed and have priors between the cutoff rules for temporary and new permanent hires
(those priors between the red and blue lines) will not be upgraded to new permanent
contracts. The firm will endogenously separate from the worker in these instances. The
difference between these cutoffs becomes larger as a worker progresses through the life-
cycle. This phenomenon is due to the horizon effect as discussed in Che´ron et al. (2013).
As workers age, the value of being unemployed decreases monotonically since they have
a shorter work horizon and fewer chances, if they are low-skilled, to be upgraded to the
higher human capital level. Firms will be more willing to offer temporary contracts to
older workers since workers’ outside option, the value of being unemployed, is decreasing
with age, giving the firm a stronger bargaining position.
Unlike the case with temporary positions, firms will be more selective when they
have to offer a new permanent contract to older workers. Firms will not be able to be
matched long enough with an older worker to offset any dismissal costs. The minimum
wage prevents the firm from sharing this sunk cost with the worker upon meeting. Very
late in the life-cycle, not even matches that have been revealed to be good will be hired
in permanent positions because the minimum wage becomes higher than the match
surplus itself. To summarize, firms are most willing to offer a new permanent contract
to younger workers with relatively high priors pi. Firms prefer younger workers on new
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permanent contracts because they have time to infer whether the match quality is good
or not and have more periods to benefit from the relationship.
Figure 4.5 shows the job-finding and separation rates for each age group. While the
separation rate delivers a reasonable profile, the job-finding rate is initially increasing
in age, which is counterfactual. Older unemployed workers can find jobs easier because
the cutoff rules for temporary contracts decreases faster than the cutoff rules increase
on new permanent contracts. Additionally, older unemployed workers are more likely
to have achieved a higher human capital level.
20 30 40 50 60
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Age (years)
Jo
b−
Fi
nd
in
g 
Ra
te
 (b
y a
ge
 gr
ou
p)
Job−Finding Rate
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.055
Se
pa
ra
tio
n 
Ra
te
 (b
y a
ge
 gr
ou
p)
Separation Rate
Age (years)
Figure 4.5: Job-Finding and Separation Rates
I now take the baseline parametrization and evaluate the implications of increasing
access to temporary contracts in the model economy. The main policy instrument that
changed in Italy between 1997 and 2004 were the restrictions imposed on temporary
contracts. In the model, this reform is captured in a reduced form way by the parameter
φ. For a given change in φ, the economy’s market-tightness must adjust in order to
satisfy the free-entry condition, which, in turn, will affect the value functions of firms
and workers. The overall impact on each age group’s unemployment rate is shown
in Figure 4.6 and demonstrates that a reform increasing access to temporary forms
of employment decreases the unemployment rates for all age groups. Figure 4.6 also
shows the incidence of temporary employment, capturing the decreasing incidence of
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temporary contracts. There is a slight uptick for both near the end of the life-cycle
when firms cease upgrading and hiring workers to permanent positions.
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Figure 4.6: Unemployment and the Incidence of Temporary Employment
The primary focus of this paper is on how two-tier labor market reforms impact
workers’ welfare of different ages. I measure an age group’s welfare as the sum of the
value functions of each worker and of each unemployed worker within a cohort. This is:
Welfarea =
H∑
h=1
ua,hUa,h+
H∑
h=1
∫ 1
0
[
eT,a,h(pi)WT,a,h(pi) + eP0,a,h(pi)WP0,a,h(pi) + eP,a,h(pi)WP,a,h(pi)
]
dpi
Since each cohort has measure one, the within cohort welfare is simply a weighted
average of the expected net present value lifetime utilities of all workers and unemployed
aged a.
A set of summary statistics comparing the steady-state outcomes is shown in Table
4.4. In the baseline parameterization, firms prefer to offer temporary contracts to low-
skilled workers, so increasing firms’ ability to offer such contracts will increase the value
of a vacancy. As a result, the number of vacancies will increase up to the point in which
the value of a vacancy returns to zero. Therefore, as φ increases, the job-meeting rate
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will increase as well. Since the job-meeting rate applies to workers of all ages, workers
in all age groups are more likely to be interviewed by a firm. Compared to the baseline
calibration, the cutoff rules for younger workers actually decrease for all contract types,
pushing unemployment down for all ages.
Despite the lower unemployment rate for all age groups, workers are worse off rela-
tive to the benchmark economy when temporary contracting increases, as can be seen
in Figure 4.7 and as reported is Table 4.4. Workers effectively become ‘trapped’ in tem-
porary positions early in the life-cycle and cannot quickly upgrade their human capital.
Indeed, since the probability a temporary contract must be upgraded, η is only 0.056,
many young workers will not transition to permanent positions rapidly. The value of be-
ing unemployed at the lowest skill level is also lower, decreasing the bargaining positions
of unskilled workers.
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Figure 4.7: Welfare Relative to the Benchmark Economy
The amount of separations increases as φ increases. Even though the firm is less
selective overall, more people will be separated endogenously because the cutoff rules for
the temporary contracts decreases more than the cutoff rule for entry into permanent
positions, increasing the total amount of separations within each age group. These
results are in agreement with the argument put forward in Blanchard and Landier
(2002) that the increased turnover in France seems to have had a negative impact on
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workers’ welfare. In the model I have presented, this is due not only to turnover, but
also to the opportunity cost of the inability to upgrade skill set early in the life-cycle.
Workers’ ability to enjoy the benefits of a long, productive career in a good permanent
match are inhibited when they cannot quickly transition to permanent positions early
in their careers.
4.6 Conclusion
In a number of European countries, the fraction of young people with temporary jobs
and the youth unemployment rate are quite high. Many new labor market entrants
in Europe pass through a spell of temporary employment before they transition to
permanent positions that are protected by strict EPL. This paper’s primary goal was to
examine the role of dual labor markets and how two-tier labor market reforms affect the
employment prospects for labor market entrants. To achieve this, the paper presented a
search and matching model with dual labor markets, overlapping generations of workers,
and general and match-specific skills. The model was calibrated to match the pre-
reform economy of Italy. When access to temporary contracts increases, firms will be
less selective in their hiring practices and the job-finding rate will increase, decreasing
the unemployment rate for all age groups. Despite the increased likelihood of being
employed, younger workers, as a group, will be worse off due to a greater share of workers
starting their careers in low-paying temporary positions, limiting young workers’ ability
to upgrade their skill level early in the life-cycle. This complements the findings of
Blanchard and Landier (2002) who have concluded that partial labor reforms may lead
to higher turnover and lower welfare. Future work should take the life-cycle into account
when examining two-tier labor market reforms since reforms may have a negative impact
on worker’s career prospects early in their life-cycle.
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Benchmark
Data φ = 0.138 φ = 0.0 φ = 0.2 φ = 0.4 φ = 0.6 φ = 0.8 φ = 1.0
Youth unemployment rate 0.222 0.260 0.294 0.246 0.205 0.172 0.145 0.123
Prime unemployment rate 0.065 0.070 0.080 0.066 0.056 0.048 0.042 0.037
Youth incidence of temp 0.097 0.103 – 0.145 0.263 0.362 0.448 0.524
Prime incidence of temp 0.035 0.035 – 0.048 0.086 0.116 0.142 0.165
Job-finding rate 0.109 0.133 0.108 0.145 0.187 0.234 0.287 0.346
Separation rate 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.018
Wage gap 0.720 0.759 – 0.762 0.770 0.776 0.780 0.782
90-10 net earnings ratio 2.370 2.483 2.438 2.503 2.519 2.508 2.509 2.513
50-10 net earnings ratio 1.518 1.025 1.008 1.031 1.034 1.025 1.022 1.019
Relative to Benchmark
Average wage – – 1.018 0.995 0.975 0.958 0.942 0.928
Workers’ welfare gain (%) – – 0.66 -0.30 -1.24 -2.17 -3.12 -4.11
Youth welfare gain (%) – – 0.57 -0.27 -1.21 -2.22 -3.31 -4.50
Prime welfare gain (%) – – 0.74 -0.32 -1.32 -2.28 -3.23 -4.20
Table 4.4: Summary of Model Outcomes
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Derivation of the Equilibrium Conditions
Households solve following dynamic programming problem.
V (S, sH) = max
c,s′,a′H
{u(c) + nν(1− h) + (1− n)ν(1) + βE[V (S′, s′H)]}
s.t.
c+
a′H
1 + r (S)
+ p (S) s′ = w (S, sH)nh (S, sH) + (1− n)b+ aH
+ [p (S) + d (S)] s− T (S)
n′ = (1− χ)n+ Ψ (S) (1− n)
S′ = G(S), c ≥ 0, No-Ponzi condition
Let λH and piH be the Lagrange multipliers on budget constraint and law of motion
for employment respectively. Then, we have the following first order conditions:
[c] u′(c)− λH = 0
[s′] βE[V ′s ]− λHp = 0
[a′H ] βE[V
′
a′H
]− λH 11+r = 0
Also, from the envelope conditions we have
VaH = λH
Vs = λH(p+ d)
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By combining the first order conditions and envelope conditions, we get the following
the no-arbitrage condition between shares and bonds.
1 = E
[
m′ (1 + r)
]
1 = E
[
m′
(
p′ + d′
p
)]
where m′ = βuc (c′) /uc (c) is the stochastic discount factor.
Now, the representative firm solves following problem.
J(S, sF ) = max
d,k′,a′F ,v,n′
{d+ E[m′J(S′, s′F )]}
s.t.
k′ + aF + ϕ(d, d−) = F (z, k, nh (S, sF )) + (1− δ)k
− w (S, sF )nh (S, sF )− cvv + a
′
F
R (S)
ξ
(
k′ − a
′
F
1 + r (S)
)
≥ F (z, k, nh (S, sF ))
n′ = (1− χ)n+ Φ (S) v
S′ = G(S), k′, v ≥ 0
Let λ, γ, and pi be the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint, enforcement
constraint, and law of motion for employment respectively. Then, we have the following
first order conditions.
[d] 1 + E[m′J ′d− ]− λϕd = 0
[k′] E[m′J ′k]− λ+ γξ = 0
[a′F ] E[m
′J ′aF ] + λ
1
1+r(1−τ) − γξ 11+r = 0
[v] −λcv + piΦ = 0
[n′] E[m′J ′n] = pi
Also, from the envelope conditions we have
Jk = (λ− γ)Fk + (1− δ)λ
JaF = −λ
Jn ≡ (λ− γ)zFnhh− λwh+ (1− χ)E[m′J ′n]
Jd = −λϕd
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By combining the first order conditions and envelope conditions, we simply get the
following first order conditions for the firm.
1− E[m′λ′ϕ′d ] = λϕd
λcv = ΦE
[
m′J ′n
]
λ− γξ = E [m′ [(λ′ − γ′)F ′k + (1− δ)λ′]]
λ (1 + r)− γξR = R (1 + r)E [m′λ′]
where R = 1 + r(1− τ) is the effective gross interest rate.
A.2 Derivation of Nash Bargaining Solutions
Given the worker’s bargaining weight µ ∈ (0, 1), the wage and hours are solutions to
the Nash bargaining problem:
(w, h) = arg max
w,h
(
Vn
uc
)µ
(Jn)
1−µ
The first order conditions for this problem are
[w] µJn = (1− µ)λ(Vnuc )
[h]
µJn
(
−v(1−h)(1−h)uc + w
)
= −(1− µ)Vnuc ((λ− γ)Fnh − λw)
(1− µ)
(
Vn
uc
)(
−v(1−h)(1−h)uc + w
)
= −(1− µ)
(
Vn
uc
)
((λ− γ)Fnh − λw)(
−v(1−h)(1−h)uc + w
)
= −(1− γλ)Fnh + w
v(1−h)(1−h)
uc
=
(
1− γλ
)
Fnh
The equilibrium wage bill can be derived from the sharing rule and the definition of
Vn
uc
and Jn.
µJn = (1− µ)λ
(
Vn
uc
)
µ
(
(λ− γ)Fnhh− λwh+ (1− χ)E[m′J ′n]
)
=
(1− µ)λ
(
v(1− h)− v(1)
uc
+ (wh− b) + (1− χ−Ψ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
])
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wh = µ
((
1− γ
λ
)
Fnhh
)
+ (1− µ)
(
v(1)− v(1− h)
uc
+ b
)
+µ(1− χ)E
[
m′
J ′n
λ
]
− (1− µ)(1− χ−Ψ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
]
= µ
((
1− γ
λ
)
Fnhh
)
+ (1− µ)
(
v(1)− v(1− h)
uc
+ b
)
+µ(1− χ)E
[
m′
J ′n
λ
]
+ µΨE
[
m′
J ′n
λ′
]
− (1− µ)(1− χ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
]
Using the sharing rule µJn = λ (1− µ) (Vn/uc) and Fnhh = Fn, along with the
definition of Vn/uc and Jn, gives the wage bill per worker:
wh = µ
[(
1− γ
λ
)
Fn + (1− χ)E
[
m′
J ′n
λ
]
+
V
1−N ΦE
[
m′
J ′n
λ′
]]
(A.1)
+ (1− µ)
[
ν (1)− ν (1− h)
uc
+ b− (1− χ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
]]
A.3 Data
Data for Employment, Average Weekly Hours Worked, and the Labor Force are taken
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Total GDP and business GDP are taken from the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) published by the Bureau of Economics
Analysis. Real wages are defined as labor compensation plus labor’s share of proprietors
income deflated by the GDP deflator and divided by total hours (employment multiplied
by average weekly hours). Labor productivity is defined as total GDP divided by total
hours. Vacancies are constructed using the Conference Board’s Help-Wanted Index and
the composite Help-Wanted Index by Barnichon (2010).
Equity Payouts and Debt Repurchases are taken from the Flow of Funds published
by the Federal Reserve Board. Equity Payouts are defined as Net dividends of nonfi-
nancial business minus Net increase in corporate equities of nonfinancial business minus
Proprietors’ net investment of nonfinancial business.
Debt Repurchases are the negative of Net increase in credit markets instruments
of nonfinancial business. Both Equity payouts and Debt repurchases are divided by
business GDP from NIPA. Total GDP is used to compute the correlations reported in
Table 2.1.
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The capital stock is constructed similar to JQ. Using the law of motion of capital
kt+1 = kt + Investment−Depreciation
we define Depreciation as Consumption of fixed capital in nonfinancial corporate busi-
ness plus Consumption of fixed capital in nonfinancial noncorporate business taken from
the Flow of Funds. Investment is measured as Capital expenditures in non financial
business, also from the Flow of Funds. Both variables are deflated by the price index for
business GDP from NIPA. The initial capital stock is chosen so that the capital-output
ratio in the business sector does not display any trend over the period 1952:Q1-2012:Q1.
The stock of debt is constructed (again, similar to JQ) using the law of motion
bet+1 = b
e
t + Net New Borrowing
where Net New Borrowing is defined as the Net increase in credit markets instruments
of nonfinancial business taken from the Flow of Funds. bet+1 = bt+1/ (1 + rt) since this
is the model equivalent of the end-of-period debt reported in the data. We take the
initial value of the stock of debt to be the nonfinancial business sector’s stock of debt
in 1952:Q1 from the balance sheet data reported in the Flow of Funds. We deflate the
constructed series by the price index for business GDP from NIPA.
